Using contingent claims analysis, I quantify the effect of risk-reducing corporate diversification on the value of equity as a call option on firm assets. The impact of conglomeration on firm risk is heavily conditioned on firm size. In contrast to small firms, the risk of large firms does not decline with increasing conglomeration. Accounting for this effect, the expected equity discount is much lower than commonly assumed and can even turn into a premium if the path dependency of equity is incorporated. My results stand in direct contrast to those of Mansi and Reeb (2002) and caution against using asset substitution as a qualitative argument for explaining economy-wide value phenomena.

Given equity's convex payoff function, shareholders can transfer wealth from bondholders by increasing firm risk. We test the existing hypothesis that convertible debt reduces this classical agency problem of risk-shifting. First, we derive a measure of shareholders' risk incentives induced by convertible debt using a contingent claims framework. We then document that when risk-shifting incentives are high, the propensity to issue convertible (rather than straight) debt increases and the negative stock market reaction following convertible debt issue announcements is amplified. We further highlight that convertible debt is the only type of security that affects business risk durably downwards. Our conclusions support the agency theoretic rationale for convertible debt financing especially for financially distressed firms.