This study compares the performance of sell-side equity analysts with and without a Chartered Financial Analyst® (CFA) designation. Using a large sample of forecasts, our tests indicate that CFA charterholders issue forecasts that are timelier than those of non-charterholders. The results for accuracy are mixed. We establish that while charterholders perform at statistically significant higher levels than non-charterholders in some tests, the economic significance of these differences is questionable. For a subsample of analysts, we find evidence that charterholders improve along the dimension of timeliness after they receive their CFA charter. This result provides support for a human-capital explanation in which charterholders improve their productivity during the CFA program. Finally, we show that the market reaction for smaller firms is stronger for charterholders than non-charterholders after controlling for timeliness, boldness, accuracy, and optimism. This result provides evidence consistent with “credentialism,” a variant of signaling theory in which a professional's education level provides a signal about the professional's quality to his or her clients.

Investors, regulators, academics, and researchers all emphasize the importance of financial statement comparability. However, an empirical construct of comparability is typically not specified. In addition, little evidence exists on the benefits of comparability to users. This study attempts to fill these gaps by developing a measure of financial statement comparability. Empirically, this measure is positively related to analyst following and forecast accuracy, and negatively related to analysts? dispersion in earnings forecasts. These results suggest that financial statement comparability lowers the cost of acquiring information, and increases the overall quantity and quality of information available to analysts about the firm.

We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing.

The US Department of Justice's increasing use of deferred prosecution and non‐prosecution agreements (D/NPAs) over the past two decades has sparked debate about their merits compared with traditional plea deals, which often result in criminal convictions. This study examines the factors influencing prosecutors' decisions to use D/NPAs in disciplining firms for corporate misconduct. We analyze whether the likelihood of a firm's future misconduct varies by the type of discipline imposed, comparing the effectiveness of D/NPAs to traditional prosecution. Our findings reveal that prosecutors are more likely to employ D/NPAs with firms when a criminal conviction could cause significant economic harm to stakeholders. However, firms subject to D/NPAs are more likely to commit subsequent violations compared with those entering plea deals. As D/NPAs gain traction in the United States and internationally, our research highlights a trade‐off: while D/NPAs mitigate harm to innocent stakeholders, they are less effective at deterring future misconduct than traditional prosecutions.

This study uses a large sample of sell‐side bond analysts' reports to examine the properties of recommendations provided by bond analysts and the impact of these recommendations on bond securities. First, we document that the distribution of bond analysts' buy, hold, and sell recommendations is skewed positively, but less so than the distribution of equity analysts' recommendations. The positive skewness in bond analysts' recommendations is greater for low than for high credit quality bonds. Second, we find that bond analysts' reports generate bond trading and return reactions that are both economically significant and greater for low credit quality bonds. The bond market reaction is greater for bond analysts' reports than for equity analysts' reports. Finally, while both bond and equity analysts lead rating agency announcements, we find no evidence of a difference in timeliness between bond and equity analysts' reports. Overall, our results are consistent with bond analysts issuing more negative reports than equity analysts and providing more information about low credit quality bonds as a result of the asymmetric demand for negative information by bond investors.

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.

We examine the valuation of financial statement note information at the time of 10-K filings. We find that stock returns around 10-K filings are positively related to accounting adjustments calculated from financial statement note information. We further document that the likelihood of equity analysts issuing a report and updating their target price estimates at the 10-K dates is increasing in the magnitude of the adjustments. Those analysts who do update their target prices at this time revise their estimates consistent with the sign and magnitude of the adjustments. These findings are consistent with financial statement users utilizing financial statement note information to make accounting adjustments, thereby incorporating this information into stock prices. JEL Classifications: G14, G29, M40, M41, M44. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources identified in the article.

We investigate a sample of 50 firm-events, identified in the Global Research Analysts Settlement, in which analysts were discovered to have acted misleadingly ex post. In this setting, analysts' incentives caused them to issue public disclosures that differed from their private beliefs. We document that these firms' institutional holdings decline significantly during the period in which the analysts issued misleading disclosures. During this period daily small-size trades (a proxy for individual investors) are dominated by buy orders while daily large-size trades (a proxy for institutional investors) are dominated by sell orders. Short interest increases during the event period, consistent with the idea that sophisticated investors are selling. Our estimates of investors' trading losses show that individual investors lost about two and a half times the amount lost by institutions. Overall, the results suggest a wealth transfer from individuals to institutions that is likely attributable to analysts' misleading behavior.

We exploit the staggered state‐level adoption of the Riegle‐Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how banking deregulation and the resulting increase in bank competition affect firms’ auditor choices. We find that an exogenous increase in the degree of interstate branch banking deregulation leads to a reduction in firms’ propensity to engage a Big N or industry expert auditor. This main result, when combined with our cross‐sectional analyses, offers evidence suggesting that deregulation leads to less demand for higher quality auditors because (1) firms have increased access to credit, which reduces the benefits of higher audit quality; (2) entering banks’ lending expertise substitutes for higher quality financial statements; (3) incumbent banks with less lending expertise seek to protect their rents by preferring that borrowers provide lower quality financial statement information; and (4) external stakeholders delegate their monitoring to banks to a greater degree, resulting in less demand for higher quality financial statements. As such, our study sheds light on how the U.S. credit market's infrastructure shapes firms’ auditor choice decisions.