In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, a series of measures have been proposed to regulate the OTC derivatives market. The motivation is to increase the disclosure of OTC transactions aiming to decrease the probability of crisis. The main objective of this paper is to investigate how regulatory changes in the OTC derivatives market affect the non-financial sector. The Brazilian FX derivatives market provides a natural experiment for this issue: in 2011, the Brazilian government taxed short positions in FX derivatives to reduce the carry trade, which was causing the local currency to appreciate. Although Chamon and Garcia (2013, Capital control in Brazil: effective? International Monetary Fund, manuscript) find that this policy helped reduce the incentives for carry trade strategies, it could have unintended consequences on other markets. For example, if banks pass through the extra cost to clients, this taxation may affect the FX hedges of non-financial firms. This paper investigates whether, and if so how much, the increase in the cost of OTC derivatives is transferred to the non-financial sector. The results indicate that this cost more than doubled for companies exposed to devaluation of the local currency (for instance, importers). Although a thorough welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, the findings suggest that this cost increase may be a concern to the extent that it could prevent EME firms from hedging their FX positions, as the NDF quotation of some EMEs is high due to the interest rate differentials.

Firms’ currency exposure can lead to financial distress and macroeconomic instability. Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives provided by financial institutions are the primary risk management tool for nonfinancial firms. However, the role of financial institutions in providing these derivatives remains underexplored in the literature. Using novel loan and derivatives microdata, we examine how lending relationships influence access to foreign exchange (FX) OTC derivatives. We find that firms are more likely to trade derivatives with their lending relationship banks than with other banks, with a stronger preference for their main lender. These effects are more pronounced for small firms and first-time derivatives users, highlighting how lending relationships reduce informational and search costs, thereby facilitating access to hedging. Additionally, derivatives prices are lower when traded with the firms’ main lender and lenders providing loans in foreign currency, indicating that banks encourage hedging to reduce risks in their loan portfolios.