Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis198116(1), 113
This study focuses on the risk-return characteristics of investments in the common stocks of U.S.–based multinational corporations (MNCs) and U.S. national corporations (NATLs). Findings follow from a comparison of the risk-adjusted performance of MNCs and NATLs using the framework of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Results of this comparison challenge assertions of earlier writers that marginal benefits or advantages accrue from investments in MNCs as compared to NATLs.
Journal Article Estimating Input Demand Equations by Direct and Indirect Methods Get access H. R. Wills H. R. Wills London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 48, Issue 2, April 1981, Pages 255–270, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296883 Published: 01 April 1981 Article history Received: 01 January 1979 Accepted: 01 November 1980 Published: 01 April 1981
The study examines the impact of convertible security calls on securityholder's wealth. On average common stock values fall by approximately two percent at the announcements of convertible debt calls, but common stockholder's wealth is unaffected by convertible preferred stock calls. These findings are consistent with a corporate tax effect. A small average decrease in firm value is also found at the announcements of convertible debt calls. The study raises, but leaves unanswered, the interesting question of what motivates managers to make capital structure decisions that reduce stockholder wealth and firm value.
The Review of Economics and Statistics198163(4), 495
THE decline in the rate of productivity growth that has occurred in the private nonfarm economy during the last decade has been particularly acute in the construction industry. Between 1950 and 1968, labor productivity in the private nonfarm sector rose at an annual rate of 2.4%; between 1968 and 1978 the yearly rise was only 1.2%. In the construction industry productivity rose by about 2.4% annually between 1950 and 1968, but has declined by 2.8% annually since then. This paper addresses seven possible explanations for these trends in construction industry productivity. These include (a) the measurement of real output, (b) shifts in the composition of construction industry output, (c) changes in capital per worker, (d) demographic changes in the workforce, (e) economies of scale, (f) regional shifts, and (g) changes in work rules or practices. The results are disconcerting. Only a small portion of the deterioration in productivity is explained by these factors. In all of the presentations below, rates of growth are measured from 1950 to 1968 and from 1968 to 1978, except where precluded by the unavailability of data. Labor productivity reached a peak in 1968 and thus this date serves as a convenient point to split the historical period. Prior to 1968 there were only a few years, depending on the measure used, in which productivity declined; after 1968 there were only one or two years in which productivity increased. The problem of declining productivity cannot be isolated to a particular year or two, but rather has persisted almost without exception for the last decade. Measures of growth in labor productivity are displayed in table 1. The measure of output in each case is real value added. While there are differences between these rates of productivity growth, they are relatively minor. This suggests that productivity differences due to (a) the distinction between hours worked and hours paid, (b) the distinction between employees and all persons, which also includes proprietors and unpaid family workers, and (c) the distinction between employment and hours, reflecting changes in the number of hours worked per employee, are not particularly important in explaining the decline in construction productivity in the last decade. In this sense the problem is not how to measure productivity.