Private Truths, Public Lies is a splendid book. It tackles a long list of interesting and important questions that have been discussed at length, and largely unsuccessfully, by scholars from each of the social sciences. Kuran blends the insights of economics, psychology, sociology, and political science into a behavioral model that moves the discussion forward on many fronts. His may not be the model that many traditional economists might have chosen, but it is one that most can live with.

The study examines how the risk of exhausting corporate tax liabilities before deducting interest expense affects corporate leverage. It differs from prior studies in three ways: (1) it uses data compiled by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from corporate tax returns rather than accounting data; (2) it measures risk of tax exhaustion more accurately; and (3) it adopts a first‐difference time‐series approach, so that firms act as their own control between adjacent years. These methodological innovations reduce biases caused by measurement error and omitted variables that were present in prior research. The results suggest that, all else being equal, high risk of tax exhaustion reduces firms' use of leverage. As well, the study provides the first evidence that personal taxes significantly affect corporate leverage. The effects on leverage decisions of other variables are also tested and the results are consistent with predictions from prior theoretical work.

Résumé. L'auteur examine comment le risque d'épuisement des obligations fiscales des sociétés avant la déduction des intérêts débiteurs influe sur leur niveau d'endettement. L'étude diffère des travaux précédents sous trois aspects: 1) elle fait usage de données compilées par l'Internal Revenue Service (IRS) à partir des déclarations de revenus des sociétés plutôt que de données comptables; 2) elle mesure le risque d'épuisement de l'impôt avec plus de précision; et 3) elle fait appel à une méthode reposant sur les séries chronologiques et le calcul des différences d'ordre 1, de sorte que les sociétés servent d'élément d'autocontrôle entre années successives. Ces innovations méthodologiques réduisent les distorsions attribuables à l'erreur de mesure et aux variables omises que l'on retrouvait dans les travaux précédents. Les résultats donnent à penser que, toutes choses étant égales par ailleurs, le risque élevé d'épuisement de l'impôt amène les sociétés à réduire leur utilisation du levier financier. L'étude fournit également des données confirmant pour la première fois que les impôts des particuliers influent de manière sensible sur le niveau d'endettement des sociétés. Les effets des décisions relatives au niveau d'endettement sur d'autres variables font également l'objet de tests dont les résultats confirment les prévisions énoncées dans les travaux théoriques précédents.

This paper examines the correlation between the returns on individual stocks and the yield changes of individual bonds issued by the same firm, and finds that they are negatively and contemporaneously correlated. This suggests that individual stocks and bonds are driven by firm-specific information that is predominantly related to the mean, rather than the variance, of the firm's underlying assets. Furthermore, I find that lagged stock returns have explanatory power for current bond yield changes, while current stock returns are unrelated to lagged bond yield changes. This shows that stocks lead bonds in reflecting firm-specific information.

This article concerns dual job holding and its link to job mobility. We present evidence from U.S. data on patterns of dual job holding, hours changes, and job mobility. We find that workers move into and out of second jobs frequently, that these movements are associated with large changes in work hours, and that hours constraints may prompt workers to take second jobs. Second, we review theories of dual job holding and present a stochastic dynamic model of dual job holding and job mobility in which decisions to take second jobs and/or change main jobs are made simultaneously.

Financial ratios, Price-Earnings Ratio, Market-to-Book ratios, Earnings Growth

An active market for corporate control has prompted corporate managers to lobby for measures that protect their positions. It has been argued that corporate managements have worked to entrench themselves at the expense of outside shareholders and have pressured institutional investors (including banks) to vote on corporate matters in a manner supportive of managements' proposals. One source of potential pressure arises when bank fiduciaries manage employee savings plans, pension funds, and engage in other fee generating corporate trust activities for firms whose shares they vote. In addition, banks often extend commercial credit to firms whose shares the trust division votes. Finally, director interlock between banks and corporations is likely to bias voting behavior. Fiduciary loyalty may be compromised by bankers' concern that failure to support management can threaten business relationships. The objective of this study is to investigate the effects of conflicting relationships on the voting behavior of banks as fiduciaries. The empirical results indicate that where director interlock and income-related relationships exist, banks tend to vote in favor of management antitakeover proposals; however, where these business relationships do not exist banks tend to vote against such proposals.

This paper derives and numerically simulates maximum likelihood estimators for the drift in several important diffusion price models. The time series convergence properties of these estimators are compared to those of standard estimators including the geometric and arithmetic means. Merton (1980) demonstrated that it is difficult to efficiently estimate the drift in a log-normal diffusion model. We qualify and strengthen his result by noting that his estimator is the maximum likelihood estimator and by applying our simulation results. However, we also demonstrate that it is possible to efficiently estimate the drift in other useful diffusion price models. In particular, by asking just how much time is needed in order for the maximum likelihood estimators of the drift in different diffusion processes to converge, these results qualify and quantify Black's (1993) statement that “we need such a long period to estimate the average that we have little hope of seeing changes in expected return."

The study examines the capital market pricing of discretionary and nondiscretionary components of a major accrual in the banking industry, the allowance for loan losses. The analysis employs a two-stage approach in which the allowance account is first decomposed into estimates of its nondiscretionary and discretionary components. The second stage evaluates the market's valuation of the estimates of the components. Evidence suggests that the capital market perceives the allowance to be comprised of two components, a nondiscretionary component which is negatively priced and a discretionary component whose incremental pricing coefficient is positive.