In the management control literature there is growing interest in the role of management control systems (MCS) in planned organizational change. The existing literature is concerned with either rational, technical change principles or more social and political interpretations of MCS facilitated change. This paper aims to extend this literature by combining technical approaches to MCS facilitated change with a behavioral approach in the study of two similar organizations. Moreover, the paper employs a holistic approach to change to develop a comprehensive understanding of the role of MCS in planned organizational change. A framework by Huy [Huy, Q. N. (2001). Time, temporal capacity, and planned change. Academy of Management Review 26(4), 601–623] is used to provide an integrative approach that focuses on both rational, systematic practices and the behavioral processes involved in their implementation. This is achieved by identifying four idealized intervention types: commanding, engineering, teaching and socializing. Understanding the application of these four intervention types requires analysis of the way they interact through time.

This study examines the relationship between post-crisis bank consolidation and the number of bank branches in Turkey. Using a unique data set, the analysis addresses several issues related to the impact of market characteristics on branching behavior. The findings suggest that sales of failed institutions by the central authority lead to branch closures in small and uncompetitive markets where the buyer does not have a prior presence. Contrary to popular belief, mergers between healthy institutions do not always cause a decrease in the number of branches; rather, they are shown to increase the availability of banking services in concentrated markets.

It is frequently claimed that high ATM surcharges actually attract customers to the banks that impose them, particularly if they operate large ATM networks. By exploiting as “natural experiments” two events associated with the lifting of surcharge bans in Iowa and in the states that neighbor Iowa, this paper seeks to test for the implications of this phenomenon as it applies to the market shares of banking institutions and to several aspects of market structure. Consistent with predictions, results of “difference-in-difference” analyses suggest that the retail account shares of larger market participants increased relative to those of smaller competitors, market concentration increased, and the number of market competitors decreased after the lifting of surcharge bans – all relative to what would have occurred had there been no change in authority to surcharge.

ABSTRACT Recent work suggests that institutional investors execute profitable trades based on private information about earnings and returns. We provide new evidence on the prevalence and sources of such informed trading by (1) testing for the creation and liquidation of positions based on private information, (2) introducing private information proxies that reflect the size and nature of an institution's position in each portfolio firm, and (3) using a methodology that examines multiple investor characteristics simultaneously at the institution‐firm level. We find that changes in ownership by institutions with large positions in a firm are consistent with informed trading. However, other previously documented proxies for private information produce results more consistent with risk‐based trading (e.g., investment style) or insignificant in the presence of other proxies (e.g., fiduciary type). We also find that informed trading is more prevalent in small firms and when the large positions are taken by investment advisers and large institutions.

This paper develops and applies some new results in the theory of monotone comparative statics. Let f be a real-valued function defined on Rl and consider the problem of maximizing f(x) when x is constrained to lie in some subset C of Rl. We develop a natural way to order the constraint sets C and find the corresponding restrictions on the objective function f that guarantee that optimal solutions increase with the constraint set. We apply our techniques to problems in consumer, producer, and portfolio theory. We also use them to generalize Rybcsynski's theorem and the LeChatelier principle.

This paper discusses the nature, and magnitude, of externalities associated with automobile use, including local and global pollution, oil dependence, traffic congestion and traffic accidents. It then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities, including fuel taxes, fuel economy and emissions standards, and alternative fuel policies, summarizing, insofar as possible, the welfare effects of those policies. Finally, we discuss emerging pricing policies, including congestion tolls, and insurance reform, and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities.

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.

1910) began soon after (i) the discovery that a variety of health problems among Southerners could be attributed to the disease and (ii) the donation by John D. Rockefeller of a substantial sum to the effort. The Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (RSC) surveyed infection rates in the affected areas (eleven southern states) and found that an average of forty percent of school-aged children were infected with hookworm. The RSC then sponsored treatment and education campaigns across the region. Follow-up studies indicate that this campaign substantially reduced hookworm disease almost immediately. The sudden introduction of this treatment combines with the cross-area differences in pre-treatment infection rates to form the basis of the identification strategy. Areas with higher levels of hookworm infection prior to the RSC experienced greater increases in school enrollment, attendance, and literacy after the intervention. This result is robust to controlling for a variety of alternative factors, including differential trends across areas, changing crop prices, shifts in certain educational and health policies, and the effect of malaria eradication. No significant contemporaneous results are found for adults, who should have benefited less from the intervention owing to their substantially lower (prior) infection rates. A long-term follow-up of affected cohorts indicates a substantial gain in income that coincided with exposure to hookworm eradication. I also find evidence that eradication increased the return to schooling.