Jonathan H. Adler of William and Mary Law School reviews “The Chevron Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall, and the Future of the Administrative State” by Thomas W. Merrill. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Explores the standard that courts apply in determining whether an administrative agency has correctly interpreted the statute under which it operates, delving into where this standard – the Chevron doctrine – came from, how it spread, and arguments over its adequacy.”

We demonstrate that a persistent pattern exists in the evolution of the MTB ratio from 1999 to 2023, wherein firms with high (low) MTB ratios tend to maintain those levels over time. The persistence of the MTB ratio is independent of industry effects and cannot be well explained by accounting performance. Intangible investment plays a crucial role in determining the MTB ratio, and its persistence is primarily maintained through continued internal intangible investment rather than external mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, although U.S. firms have increased their investment in intangible assets over the past 25 years, the gap between high- and low-MTB firms in intangible investment has widened. Our results suggest that the basis of stock value has shifted from tangible to intangible investments over time.

The change in the cost of capital that results from a divestiture strategy can be closely approximated by a simple function of three parameters: (1) the fraction of socially conscious capital, (2) the fraction of targeted firms in the economy and (3) the return correlation between the targeted firms and the rest of the stock market. When calibrated to current data, we demonstrate that the impact on the cost of capital is too small to meaningfully affect real investment decisions. We then derive the conditions that would be required for the strategy to have a meaningful impact. We empirically corroborate our theoretical results by studying firm changes in ESG status and are unable to detect an impact of ESG divestiture strategies on the cost of capital of treated firms. Our results suggest that to have impact, instead of divesting, socially conscious investors should invest and exercise their rights of control to change corporate policy.

Utilizing a unique and novel setting of disclosure mandate threshold under Regulation AB (Reg AB), we investigate the relationship between disclosure and trust in asset securitization. Post-Reg AB enactment, we observe a significant bunching of originators just below the disclosure threshold. Less trustworthy originators are more likely to adjust their portfolio sizes to remain below this threshold, particularly when loan originators and deal sponsors are unaffiliated, which are cases in which disclosure plays a greater role in reducing information asymmetry. Additionally, these originators are more likely to misrepresent loan quality. Our findings reveal a strong relationship between disclosure and trust—trustworthy originators disclose more and originate higher-quality loans, while less trustworthy originators disclose less and produce lower-quality loans.

This paper develops a novel methodology to identify peer linkages among cryptocurrencies using natural language processing applied to financial news. We document a distinct pattern of conditional co-movement among peer assets: when a cryptocurrency experiences a large idiosyncratic shock, its peers — identified through news co-mentions — exhibit abnormal returns of the opposite sign. This mis-pricing persists for several weeks and enables profitable trading strategies. Our findings suggest that investor overreaction to news drives these dynamics, highlighting the role of financial media in shaping prices. The proposed methodology extends beyond crypto, offering a generalizable approach to studying peer effects and news-driven pricing distortions.

We examine the relations between recent board declassifications, takeover activity and takeover gains over the period 2003–2014. We report that firms that declassified their boards in the previous five years are more likely to be a takeover target compared to firms whose boards remain classified. We also report that, once targeted, these firms receive lower takeover premiums and realize lower abnormal returns around the announcement of the transaction. Finally, we find that these firms obtain a smaller share of abnormal dollar merger gains. These results are consistent with the interpretation that firms that declassified their boards have lost some bargaining power in negotiating M&A transactions.

We challenge the existing relationship lending literature on how banks manage their relationships with corporate borrowers during crises. We test theories of intertemporal smoothing during the closure period of the COVID-19 crisis when borrowers are in great need of relationship benefits. We find that relationship borrowers receive worse rather than more favorable loan contract terms than others during this period. These and other results provide novel evidence on the functioning of relationship lending during a pandemic and contrast existing evidence gleaned from banking and financial crises.

Research concludes that managers’ political orientation influences their decision-making and offers the political connections and risk tolerance hypotheses as explanations. We investigate partisan bias as an additional way political orientation may influence managers’ decisions. Partisan bias results in individuals whose partisan orientation aligns with that of the US president expressing more optimistic economic expectations. We examine whether partisan bias is present in managers’ annual earnings forecasts. We find that firms with CEOs whose partisanship aligns with that of the US president issue more optimistically biased annual earnings forecasts than firms with other CEOs. Higher-ability CEOs, however, are less susceptible to partisan bias. Additionally, we find that overestimating customer demand contributes to the forecast over-optimism of partisan-aligned CEOs and results in greater firm overinvestment. Furthermore, investors fail to discount the news in forecasts of partisan-aligned CEOs, and their firms’ post-forecast abnormal returns are lower.