Reviews the book "Accounting, Costing and Cost Estimation," by Haydn Jones.

ABSTRACT: While accounting historians agree that cost accounting is a consequence of the industrial revolution, they have not thoroughly explained the economic consequence of the industrial revolution which prompted manufacturing firms to develop actual cost accounting techniques in the nineteenth century. This paper presents an explanation for the rise of nineteenth-century cost accounting which supplements the traditional view that increased use of fixed capital and the resultant need to account for costs of long-lived assets prompted industrial accountants to graft cost accounts onto the double-entry system. The study concludes that not only changes in the temporal structure of their costs, but also changes in the way they organized economic activity, explain the conditions which prompted manufacturers to develop cost accounting procedures for gathering financial information needed by managers.

This article discusses the role of accounting history in the study of modern business enterprise. It is well known, of course, that typical manufacturing firms of the mid-nineteenth century specialized mainly in one activity: that of transforming raw materials into finished products. These manufacturing firms necessarily relied for non-manufacturing services upon outside companies that specialized, as did they, primarily in one operation. For example, the manufacturer depended upon wholesale suppliers and commission merchants to provide raw materials and to sell finished goods to the final customer. One new method for controlling and coordinating company procedure was an innovation commonly called "the unitary form of organization." The unitary form of organization also involved the design of complex accounting systems to carry out assessment, operations, and planning throughout the firm. Du Pont Powder Co. exemplifies the early use of accounting data for management control in vertically integrated industrial firms.

With the rapid growth in various types of corporate combinations, many opportunities arise in which increased internal efficiency in the allocation of capital budgeting resources may be obtained. Although the resource-transfer methodology proposed in this paper is discussed within the context of a merger/acquisition environment, the operational analysis conveivably could be applied to multiproduct, multifirm, or multinational situations. This study examines an application in which a linear programming model can be used operationally as an analytical planning device (1) to obtain efficient capital budgets for the merged companies, and (2) to quantify the monetary value of potential gains in efficiency produced by a merger. Conceptually, the model assists management in searching for excess capacity in each company, efficiently combines scarce resources, selects an optimal project list for the merged company, and indicates what the composition of the new capital budget should be. In addition, a variable step function provides for multiplicative adjustments in common resource constraints. These adjustments might be positive (negative) if the combination results in a more than proportionate increase (decrease) in the availability of a scarce resource.

FOR over three decades, debate has raged over the economic assumption that the large corporation, through the decisions of its managers, attempts to maximize its profits. Empirical analysis of the behavior of the corporation has led to conflicting claims. The inquiry into the determinants of executive compensation has been no exception. Statistical investigation of executive compensation has been dominated by a search for one decisive explanation. Is the size, measured by either sales or assets, or profitability, measured by net corporate income or by the rate of return on assets, the key variable in establishing the level of the executive's reward? Proponents on both sides of this issue-the managerialists who support the corporate growth hypothesis and the neoclassical economists who favor the profit maximization assumption-seem to argue that the contest can be resolved by the presentation of unambiguous evidence that will award victory to one side and vanquish the other. This spirit of antagonism has distorted the essential element of the executive compensation question. The behavior of the corporation and the market forces that shape this behavior can be explained or illustrated only by the use of a series of intercorrelated variables. Not one of the available measures of corporate success, be it net income, sales or assets, is an exact measure of economic profits or firm size, nor is it independent of the other variables. This study focuses on the resolution of the serious econometric problems encountered in the process of estimating the determinants of executive compensation. Later we will show how the successful elimination of problems of simultaneous equations bias, multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity leads to the conclusion that the managerialist and neoclassical models of the firm are complementary, rather than substitute, explanations for the pattern of executive compensation.

The article reviews the book "Capital Transfer Tax Planning," Third Edition, by E. Kenneth Wright and Malcolm Penney.