Using stock returns around recommendation changes to measure the information produced by analysts, I find that analysts produce more firm-specific than industry-level information. Analysts produce more firm-specific information on stocks with higher idiosyncratic return volatilities. The amount of industry information produced by analysts increases with the absolute value of the stock’s industry beta and decreases with the stock’s idiosyncratic volatility. Other stocks in the industry also respond to the recommendation change, and the magnitude of the response increases with the absolute value of the industry beta of the recommended stock and that of other stocks in the industry. I also offer results on how investors may use analyst research more effectively and potentially improve their investment performance.

We investigate the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility in a multi-asset, multi-period noisy rational expectations equilibrium. We show that the relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility is either U-shaped or negative. Using several price informativeness measures, we empirically document a U-shaped relation between price informativeness and idiosyncratic return volatility. Our study therefore reconciles the opposing views in the following two strands of literature: (1) the growing body of research showing that firms with more informative stock prices have greater idiosyncratic return volatility, and (2) the studies arguing that more information in price reduces idiosyncratic return volatility.

We analyze a firm's choice between spin-offs, equity carve-outs, and tracking stock issues and the role of institutional investors in corporate restructuring. We model a firm with two divisions. Insiders have private information about firm value and face an equity market with retail and institutional investors. We show that restructuring increases information production by institutional investors (relative to that about the consolidated firm): the highest increase in information production arises from spin-offs, the next highest from carve-outs, and the lowest from tracking stock issues. Insiders with the most favorable private information implement spin-offs; those with less favorable private information implement carve-outs; those with even less favorable private information implement tracking stock issues; and those with unfavorable private information remain consolidated. We explain the positive announcement effect and increase in analyst coverage associated with all three forms of restructuring. Our model also generates a number of novel testable predictions for firms' choice between spin-offs, carve-outs, and tracking stock issues, and for institutional trading around these three forms of restructuring.

We develop a theory of new-project financing and equity carve-outs under heterogeneous beliefs. In our model, an employee of a firm generates an idea for a new project that can be financed either by issuing equity against the cash flows of the entire firm (“integration”), or by undertaking an equity carve-out of the new project alone (“non-integration”). While the patent underlying the new project is owned by the firm, the employee generating the idea needs to be motivated to exert optimal effort for the project to be successful. The firm's choice between integration and non-integration is driven primarily by heterogeneity in beliefs among outside investors (each of whom has limited wealth to invest in the equity market) and between firm insiders and outsiders: if the marginal outsider financing the new project is more optimistic about the prospects of the project than firm insiders, and this incremental optimism of the marginal outsider over firm insiders is greater regarding new-project cash flows than that about assets-in-place cash flows, then the firm will implement the project under non-integration rather than integration. Two other ingredients driving the firm's financing choice are the cost of motivating the employee to exert optimal effort, and the potential synergies between the new project and assets in place. We derive a number of testable predictions regarding a firm's equilibrium choice between integration and non-integration. We also provide a rationale for the “negative stub values” documented in the equity carve-outs of certain firms (e.g., the carve-out of Palm from 3Com) and develop predictions for the magnitude of these stub values.