Journal Article Advertising Costs and Equilibrium Get access H. Smith H. Smith Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 2, Issue 1, October 1934, Pages 62–65, https://doi.org/10.2307/2967551 Published: 01 October 1934

Mr. Mallock's estimates, 216. — Average number of incomes per unit of the range of incomes in each group used as a measure of density, 218. — Density coefficients, 220. — Three strata of income receivers, 221. — Density coefficients vary with the reciprocals of the cubes of the corresponding incomes, 222. — Corrected average incomes for groups, 224. — Rectified tables of income distribution, 226. — Advantage in taxing all incomes above £100, 227. — Formula for graduation of the tax rate, 228. — Tax yield controlled by varying the ultimate rate, 229. — Its incidence controlled by varying the size of income to which half the ultimate rate applies, 232. — Modifications to fit the use of step rates and of abatements, 236.

Interim reporting, Auditing, Auditor association

IN THIS PAPER we consider procedures for going from several individual preferences among several alternatives, called candidates, to something which may be called a collective preference. The individual preferences take the form of (total) orderings of the alternatives, and the collective preference is to take the form of a (total) weak ordering (i.e., ties allowed). We consider certain properties which seem desirable in such and investigate which have these properties. The of view taken here differs from that of other work in this area (e.g., [1, 2, 3, 4]) chiefly in asking that the procedure work for all possible sizes of the voting population, rather than for a fixed population, given in advance. This permits us to require, for example, that if each of two bodies of voters prefers candidate A to candidate B under a given procedure, then the combination of these bodies should prefer A to B under the same procedure. In Section 1 we give the formal definitions of an aggregation procedure and discuss certain desirable features, namely neutrality (treats candidates symmetrically), (the condition mentioned above), monotonicity, and an Archimedean property which says, roughly, that a sufficiently large body with a given distribution of preferences can impose its will on any body of fixed size. In Section 2 we introduce certain procedures: point systems and systems (roughly, allowing infinitesimal points), which are neutral and separable. They are monotonic if and only if the points are arranged in the natural order, and the are, in addition, Archimedean. In Section 3 we prove a converse, namely that any neutral and separable procedure can be realized by a generalized system and, if it is Archimedean, by a system. This part requires some familiarity with the notions of least upper bound of a set of real numbers and bases of vector spaces. In Section 4 (which is largely independent of Section 3), we consider point which use in a succession of eliminations. Such are neither separable nor monotonic but do satisfy some very weak separability and monotonicity conditions. While these probably do not characterize runoff systems, we know of no other satisfying them.

IF the variable X represents the price of an active stock, it is well known that the tendency of X to change is an increasing function of price itself, say f(X). If the tendency to relative change with respect to price were constant, graphs whose amplitude of fluctuation is uncorrelated with price could be constructed by (1) plotting log X on ordinary arithmetic scale or (2) plotting X on semilogarithmic scale. However, the tendency to relative change f(X)/X has been found to be a decreasing function of X and hence any constant-amplitude scale for plotting stock prices must be based on some function other than log X, say F(X), whose derivative is inversely proportional to the tendency to change with respect to price. In other words, the desired function is any solution of the differential equation

Abstract. Public accountants (auditors) who do not prepare the financial statements of their clients are not directly responsible for them. However, if the statements are deceptive, then the question of their indirect responsibility arises. The various kinds of defenses that auditors might present for being excused from responsibility, and/or blame, are examined and evaluated. Relevant parts of the codes of ethics of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario (ICAO) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants are compared on this basis. The ICAO Code is a better codification of auditors' obligations regarding deceptive financial statements. One implication of the analysis is that the issue of the independence of auditors is more complex than the codes suggest, and needs further clarification. Résumé. Les experts‐comptables (vérificateurs) ne sont pas directement responsables des états financiers de leurs clients qu'ils ne préparent pas. Cependant, si les états financiers sont trompeurs, alors la question de leur responsabilité indirecte se pose. Les différentes sortes de défenses que les vérificateurs pourraient présenter pour ne pas être tenus responsables et/ou blâmés sont examinées et évaluées. Les parties pertinentes des codes de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario et de l'American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sont comparées sur cette base. Le code de déontologie de l'Institut des comptables agréés de l'Ontario est une meilleure codification des obligations du vérificateur en ce qui a trait aux états financiers trompeurs. Une implication de l'analyse, est que la notion de l'indépendance des vérificateurs est plus complexe que ne le suggèrent les codes et demande d'être clarifiée.

Abstract Reviews the book "Intermediate Accounting," by Walter Meigs, A.N. Mosich and Charles E. Johnson.

Abstract The article presents information on the Seminar in Accounting Research at the University of Iowa. Universities are placing increasing, and we think appropriate, emphasis upon research by faculty members. Particularly at the graduate level, ideas are volatile and subject to continuing revision. In seminar discussions, student comments take priority over faculty comments. Similarly, student papers have scheduling priority over faculty and professional contributions, with an exception made for outside guests when conflicts arise. Participants in the Seminar are, on a regular basis, graduate students in accounting and the accounting faculty. Between faculty, even "unfair" comments are allowed, but restraint is exercised in arguing with students. Faculty participation, in the manner indicated, helps to erase the illusory distinction between teaching and research, and between faculty and graduate students at the graduate level. The Seminar in Accounting Research links the diverse interests of the faculty to a common educational goal.