We argue that bank holding companies (BHCs) extend shadow insurance to the prime institutional money market funds (PI-MMFs) they sponsor and that PI-MMFs price this shadow insurance by charging investors significantly higher expense ratios and paying lower net yields. We provide evidence that after September 2008, expense ratios at BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs increased more than at non-BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs. Despite higher expense ratios, BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs did not experience larger redemptions than non-BHC-sponsored PI-MMFs. In addition, we show that expense ratios increased with BHCs’ financial strength and the likelihood of their support; however, this expense ratio differential disappeared after the 2016 MMF reform.

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.

We provide an explanation for hedging as a means of allocating rather than reducing risk. We argue that when increases in total risk are costly, firms optimally allocate risk by reducing (increasing) exposure to risks that provide zero (positive) economic rents. Our evidence shows that mutual thrifts that convert to stock institutions increase total risk following conversion, consistent with their increased abilities and incentives for risk taking. They achieve this increase by hedging interest-rate risk and increasing credit risk. We provide some evidence that risk-management activities are related to growth capacity and management compensation structure attained at conversion.

Issue size choice and underpricing in mutual-to-stock conversions of thrifts are explained as a function of growth opportunities, perquisite consumption, and proprietary information. The authors provide evidence that thrifts with greater growth opportunities choose larger issue size and experience higher after-market price appreciation. This finding persists when they allow for investors' inferences about managers' proprietary information. Variables that explain underpricing in typical initial public offerings are significant by themselves but lose significance when combined with the issue size choice variables. Managerial holdings and the offer price do not act as dissipative signals of value in thrift conversions.

Hidden capital exists whenever the accounting measure of a firm's net worth diverges from its economic value. Such unbooked capital has on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet sources. This paper develops a model to estimate both forms of hidden capital and to test hypotheses about their determinants. In effect, the analysis expands the two-index model by endogenizing the market and interest-rate sensitivities of any stock and decomposing each sensitivity into on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet elements. For a sample of banks during 1975-85, the model finds considerable variation in both forms of hidden capital.

We present evidence that the adjusted returns of merging banks’ bonds are positive and significant across pre-merger and announcement months. The cross-sectional evidence indicates that the primary determinants of merger-related bondholder gains are diversification gains, gains associated with achieving too-big-to-fail status, and, to a lesser degree, synergy gains. We obtain the same finding when we examine the acquiring banks’ credit spreads on new debt issues both before and after the merger. We also provide the first study that shows acquirers benefit by the lower cost of funds on post-merger debt issues.

[We examine how managerial incentives affect acquisition decisions in the banking industry. We find that higher pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) leads to value-enhancing acquisitions. Banks whose CEOs have higher PPS have significantly better abnormal stock returns around the time of the acquisition announcements. On average, acquirers in the high-PPS group outperform their counterparts in the low-PPS group by 1.4% in a three-day window around the announcement. Higher PPS helps reduce the incentives for making value-destroying acquisitions, while at the same time promotes value-enhancing acquisitions. The positive market reaction can be rationalized by post-merger performance. Following acquisitions, banks with higher PPS experience greater improvements in their operating performance. We show that the effect of PPS is mainly evident in small and medium-sized banks, but is not present in large banks.]

Dilip Madan, Haluk Unal, A Two-Factor Hazard Rate Model for Pricing Risky Debt and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 2000), pp. 43-65

This paper examines the intertemporal behavior of the short-term rate of interest in a mean-reverting model (Vasicek's elastic random walk model). Using the Goldfeld-Quandt switching regressions technique, we show that the mean-reverting model switched regimes three times over the sample period (March 1959 to December 1985) and that two of these switches coincide with the 1979 and 1982 changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy on interest rates. Parameter estimates prove to be unstable over the sample period. There is evidence of slow mean reversion over the entire sample period; yet significant mean-reversion emerges only in the 1979n1982 regime.