Higher-order risk preferences are important determinants of economic behavior. We apply insights from behavioral economics: we measure higher-order risk preferences for pure gains and losses. We find a reflection effect not only for second-order risk preferences, as did Kahneman and Tversky (1979), but also for higher-order risk preferences: we find risk aversion, prudence and intemperance for gains and much more risk-loving preferences, imprudence and temperance for losses. These findings are at odds with a universal preference for combining good with bad or good with good, which previous results suggest may underlie higher-order risk preferences.

Gul and Pesendorfer (2015) propose a promising theory of decision under uncertainty, they dub Hurwicz expected utility (HEU). HEU is a special case of α ‐maxmin EU that allows for preferences over sources of uncertainty. It is consistent with most of the available empirical evidence on decision under risk and uncertainty. We show that HEU is also tractable and can readily be measured and tested. We do this by deriving a new two‐parameter functional form for the probability weighting function, which fits our data well and which offers a clean separation between ambiguity perception and ambiguity aversion. In two experiments, we find support for HEU's predictions that ambiguity aversion is constant across sources of uncertainty and that ambiguity aversion and first order risk aversion are positively correlated.

We introduce a new method to measure the temporal discounting of money. Unlike preceding methods, our method requires neither knowledge nor measurement of utility. It is easier to implement, clearer to subjects, and requires fewer measurements than existing methods.