We study the role of state controlling shareholders in corporate payout policy. The State Capital Operation Program in China requires parent central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) to contribute part of their consolidated income to a new fiscal fund. We find that listed CSOEs, partially controlled by parent CSOEs, experience significant reductions in dividend payouts as the income-contribution ratio increases. The dividend reductions are concurrent with increases in intragroup resource transfers— listed CSOEs’ loans to, and commercial trades with, group peers. The program yields adverse consequences for listed CSOEs’ investment and employment, yet being mitigated by group-level dividend reductions.

We examine whether dividend tax induced lock-in reduces idiosyncratic volatility. The 2012 Dividend Tax Reform in China tied individual investors' dividend tax to the length of their shareholding period, with short-term individual investors entering into higher tax brackets. We find that high dividend firms experience a reduction in idiosyncratic volatility, relative to low dividend firms, after the reform. The effect is more pronounced when high dividend firms have more retail investors and exhibit greater uncertainty. High dividend firms also experience a reduction in stock price crashes. Finally, with reduced trading by individual investors who are likely less informed, earnings announcements of high dividend firms trigger less trading volume during the event window post-reform, but enable more complete price reactions. We conclude that dividend tax induced lock-in, through discouraging short-term individual investors' trading, stabilizes the market and improves share price informativeness.

The 2012 Dividend Tax Reform in China ties individual investors’ dividend tax rates to the length of their shareholding period. We find that firms facing a reduction (increase) in their individual investors’ dividend tax rates are more (less) likely to increase dividend payout. Such an effect is concentrated in firms where incentives of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, investors respond to this tax law change by reducing trading activities before the cum-dividend day and successfully lower their dividend tax penalty. Overall, our evidence enhances the notion that individual investors’ tax profiles shape firms’ payout policies.