Advocacy groups have responded to the lack of political solutions to some of the greatest problems we face—from climate change to armed conflicts—by lobbying for securities regulation that increases corporate transparency. They aim to incentivize corporations to address problems that lack other political solutions. I discuss what we can (and cannot) learn about the efficacy of reporting mandates from the findings in Darendeli et al. (2022) and related papers that stakeholders respond to greater availability of corporate social responsibility information. I support my arguments with evidence from mandatory conflict mineral disclosures—to date, the only related US securities regulation. Although stakeholder responses are likely necessary to incentivize changes in corporate behavior, they are insufficient to justify a mandate. A convincing justification must explain how reporting mandates lead to socially beneficial real effects, are best overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and are less costly than alternative policy instruments. So far, proponents of reporting mandates have, at best, provided incomplete justifications. These circumstances are problematic given the current push for mandatory reporting related to issues such as climate change and workplace diversity.

We examine the capital-market effects of changes in securities regulation in the European Union aimed at reducing market abuse and increasing transparency. To estimate causal effects for the population of E.U. firms, we exploit that for plausibly exogenous reasons, such as national legislative procedures, E.U. countries adopted these directives at different times. We find significant increases in market liquidity, but the effects are stronger in countries with stricter implementation and traditionally more stringent securities regulation. The findings suggest that countries with initially weaker regulation do not catch up with stronger countries, and that countries diverge more upon harmonizing regulation.

We explore revealed preferences for the contractual treatment of changes to GAAP in a large sample of private credit agreements issued by publicly held U.S. firms. We document a significant time‐trend toward excluding GAAP changes from the determination of covenant compliance over the period from 1994 to 2012. This trend is positively associated with proxies for standard setters’ shift in focus toward relevance and international accounting harmonization. At the firm level, borrowers facing higher uncertainty are more likely to write contracts that include GAAP changes, but these firms also show a more pronounced time‐trend toward excluding GAAP changes. While this evidence is broadly consistent with an efficiency role for GAAP changes in debt contracting, it is also consistent with a shift in standard setters’ focus offering a partial explanation of why fewer contracts rely on GAAP changes in 2012 than in 1994.

Building on contract theory, we argue that financial covenants control the conflicts of interest between lenders and borrowers via two different mechanisms. Capital covenants control agency problems by aligning debt holder–shareholder interests. Performance covenants serve as trip wires that limit agency problems via the transfer of control to lenders in states where the value of their claim is at risk. Companies trade off these mechanisms. Capital covenants impose costly restrictions on the capital structure, while performance covenants require contractible accounting information to be available. Consistent with these arguments, we find that the use of performance covenants relative to capital covenants is positively associated with (1) the financial constraints of the borrower, (2) the extent to which accounting information portrays credit risk, (3) the likelihood of contract renegotiation, and (4) the presence of contractual restrictions on managerial actions. Our findings suggest that accounting‐based covenants can improve contracting efficiency in two different ways.

This study collates potential economic effects of mandated disclosure and reporting standards for corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability topics. We first outline key features of CSR reporting. Next, we draw on relevant academic literatures in accounting, finance, economics, and management to discuss and evaluate the potential economic consequences of a requirement for CSR and sustainability reporting for U.S. firms, including effects in capital markets, on stakeholders other than investors, and on firm behavior. We also discuss issues related to the implementation and enforcement of CSR and sustainability reporting standards as well as two approaches to sustainability reporting that differ in their overarching goals and materiality standards. Our analysis yields a number of insights that are relevant for the current debate on mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting. It also points scholars to avenues for future research.

This paper reviews theoretical and empirical work on financial contracting that is relevant to accounting researchers. Its primary objective is to discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances contracting efficiency and to suggest avenues for future research. We argue that incomplete contract theory broadens our understanding of both the role accounting information plays in contracting and the mechanisms through which efficiency gains are achieved. By discussing its rich theoretical implications, we expect incomplete contract theory to prove useful in motivating future research and in offering directions to advance our knowledge of how accounting information affects contract efficiency.

In recent years, reporting under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) became mandatory in many countries. The capital-market effects around this change have been extensively studied, but their sources are not yet well understood. This study aims to distinguish between several potential explanations for the observed capital-market effects. We find that, across all countries, mandatory IFRS reporting had little impact on liquidity. The liquidity effects around IFRS introduction are concentrated in the European Union (EU) and limited to five EU countries that concurrently made substantive changes in reporting enforcement. There is little evidence of liquidity benefits in IFRS countries without substantive enforcement changes even when they have strong legal and regulatory systems. Moreover, we find similar liquidity effects for firms that experience enforcement changes but do not concurrently switch to IFRS. Thus, changes in reporting enforcement or (unobserved) factors associated with these changes play a critical role for the observed liquidity benefits after mandatory IFRS adoption. In contrast, the change in accounting standards seems to have had little effect on market liquidity.