The COVID-19 pandemic that we are experiencing is both tragic and shocking. There is no question that, except in some Asian countries trained by prior infectious outbreaks, most policy makers around the world have been ill-prepared to respond to the crisis. The effects of the coronavirus on our mental and physical health has been indeed calamitous, and the economic and financial impacts for many have been truly unfortunate. Furthermore, the extreme nature of the event is challenging researchers to compile and interpret new evidence that is arriving at a rapid pace. The editors Hui Chen, Thierry Foucault, Jeffrey Pontiff, and Nikolai Roussanov and contributing authors are to be commended for assembling and collating a thought-provoking collection of papers. More time and study will be needed to fully sift through the evidence and to glean the lessons to be learned from this pandemic for policy makers and investors. But the evidence and insights in this volume are a very good start.

Jurisdictions across the United States have adopted “ban the box” (BTB) policies preventing employers from asking about job applicants’ criminal records until late in the hiring process. Their goal is to improve employment outcomes for those with criminal records, with a secondary goal of reducing racial disparities in employment. However, removing criminal history information could increase statistical discrimination against demographic groups that include more ex-offenders. We use variation in the timing of BTB policies to test BTB’s effects on employment. We find that BTB policies decrease the probability of employment by 3.4 percentage points (5.1%) for young, low-skilled black men.

Abstract Geophysicists examine and document the repercussions for the earth’s climate induced by alternative emission scenarios and model specifications. Using simplified approximations, they produce tractable characterizations of the associated uncertainty. Meanwhile, economists write highly stylized damage functions to speculate about how climate change alters macroeconomic and growth opportunities. How can we assess both climate and emissions impacts, as well as uncertainty in the broadest sense, in social decision-making? We provide a framework for answering this question by embracing recent decision theory and tools from asset pricing, and we apply this structure with its interacting components to a revealing quantitative illustration.

Abstract We present a tractable heterogeneous-agent version of the New Keynesian model that allows us to study the interaction between inequality and monetary policy. Though formulated as a precautionary-saving model à la Huggett–Aiyagari, its reduced form is a two-agent model with a highly concentrated wealth distribution. When prices are sticky and wages flexible, as in the textbook representative-agent model, monetary policy affects the distribution of consumption, but has no effect on output as workers choose not to change their hours worked in response to wage movements. This highlights a transmission mechanism of the textbook model that we find implausible: in response to a monetary stimulus, the representative worker’s labor supply is greatly affected by the profits she receives. First, the lower profits induced by higher wages raise labor supply through a wealth effect and, secondly, the mere presence of profits reduces the negative income effect of a wage rise. When wages are rigid, in contrast, our model exhibits plausible responses of output and hours worked to monetary policy shocks.

We develop a new method to measure CEO behavior in large samples via a survey that collects high-frequency, high-dimensional diary data and a machine learning algorithm that estimates behavioral types. Applying this method to 1,114 CEOs in six countries reveals two types: “leaders,” who do multifunction, high-level meetings, and “managers,” who do individual meetings with core functions. Firms that hire leaders perform better, and it takes three years for a new CEO to make a difference. Structural estimates indicate that productivity differentials are due to mismatches rather than to leaders being better for all firms.