A long-standing question in finance is why companies donate to charity, often attributing it to either managerial agency problems or strategic behavior. Based on a global sample of donation announcements by firms providing relief to disaster-affected communities, we test the relative importance of these two motives and the conditions under which each dominates. We exploit disaster-specific factors in an event study setting around corporate donation announcement dates to show that, on average, relief donations decrease returns. However, the strategic benefits of donating around salient events can mitigate these negative effects. To account for firms’ donation decisions, we rely on exogenous variation in the availability of corporate charitable funds due to the timing of disasters relative to firms’ financial years. We show that donations provide new information to the market and that negative returns are primarily driven by cash donations made via corporate foundations.

Using corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings for 23,000 companies from 114 countries, we find that a firm's CSR rating and its country's legal origin are strongly correlated. Legal origin is a stronger explanation than “doing good by doing well” factors or firm and country characteristics (ownership concentration, political institutions, and globalization): firms from common law countries have lower CSR than companies from civil law countries, with Scandinavian civil law firms having the highest CSR ratings. Evidence from quasi‐natural experiments such as scandals and natural disasters suggests that civil law firms are more responsive to CSR shocks than common law firms.

In the corporate finance tradition, starting with Berle and Means (1932), corporations should generally be run to maximize shareholder value. The agency view of corporate social responsibility (CSR) considers CSR an agency problem and a waste of corporate resources. Given our identification strategy by means of an instrumental variable approach, we find that well-governed firms that suffer less from agency concerns (less cash abundance, positive pay-for-performance, small control wedge, strong minority protection) engage more in CSR. We also find that a positive relation exists between CSR and value and that CSR attenuates the negative relation between managerial entrenchment and value.

Hedge funds that endorse the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) underperform other hedge funds after adjusting for risk but attract greater investor flows, accumulate more assets, and harvest greater fee revenues. Consistent with an agency explanation, the underperformance is driven by PRI signatories with low environmental, social, and governance (ESG) exposures and is greater for hedge funds with poor incentive alignment. To address endogeneity, we exploit regulatory reforms that enhance stewardship and show that the ESG exposure and relative performance of signatory funds improve post reforms. Our findings suggest that some hedge funds endorse responsible investment to pander to investor preferences.

Using novel firm-level data on employment quality in an international sample of M&A deals, this paper investigates the cost-benefit trade-off faced by acquirers when providing generous employment policies. We find that shareholders react more positively to deal announcements by acquirers providing generous employee incentives when the deal is domestic, but negatively when the deal is cross-border. These effects are primarily driven by the provision of monetary incentives and are strongest for firms in skilled industries. We argue that generous employment policies increase synergy gains and reduce labor adjustment costs in a domestic takeover. In cross-border deals, however, costs associated with managing employee policies across borders and lack of opportunities for eliminating work duplication negatively affect acquirer returns. Nevertheless, we find that country-specific acquisition experience can mitigate these negative effects. Our results cannot be explained by country-level labor regulations or by target-level employment policies.

We examine how Confucian culture operates as an informal institution by fostering relational contracts that substitute for formal legal frameworks in shaping corporate behavior. Using data on historical Confucian academies near firms’ headquarters in China, we find that greater cultural exposure is associated with higher investment in stakeholder relationships—measured by social contribution, stakeholder protection, courtesy expenses, patenting, and trade credit. These effects persist after controlling for human capital and alternative cultural influences, and weaken in regions with stronger formal institutions. Our findings highlight the enduring role of culture in supporting trust-based governance when formal contracting is limited.

Corporate customers are an important stakeholder in global supply chains. We employ several unique international databases to test whether socially responsible corporate customers can infuse similar socially responsible business behavior in suppliers. Our findings suggest a unilateral effect on corporate social responsibility (CSR) only from customers to suppliers, an evidence further supported by exogenous variation in customers’ close-call CSR proposals and by product scandals. Customers exert influence on suppliers’ CSR through positive assortative matching and their decision-making process. Enhanced collaborative CSR efforts help improve operational efficiency and firm valuation of both customers and suppliers but increase only the customers’ future sales growth.