I. Economic structure, 425. — II. Underutilization of the ultra high frequencies, 430. — III. Network practices and public policy, 439. — IV. Conclusion, 449.

Introduction, 117. — I. The classical economists, 120. — II. Marshall and Pigou, 123. — III. Veblen and Hobson, 128. — IV. Knight and Simons, 134. — V. The Keynesians, 135. — VI. Schumpeter, 136. — VII. Conclusion, 137.

Is it feasible to trade rights to use orbital slots and associated satellite frequencies in a market? Can such rights be delimited today? What is the role of international organs like the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), national agencies like the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), or the United Kingdom's Frequency Planning Organs (FPOs)? What evidence is there that such rights or assignments are in fact configured now and do indeed exist? Are they frequently traded in international as well as domestic broadcast and mobile radio services? Even if practical and viable, what economic policy or equity purposes are served by configuring actual markets for transferable or exchangeable orbit spectrum assignments? Or for schemes where national or international authorities distribute such assignments under competition or specifically by auction to the highest bidder? That is, through public as well as private auctions? Do auctions in any case further distributive equity and not just economic efficiency?'

The growing demand for spectrum-communication frequencies-has once more come to outstrip its supply. Electrical interference, congestion, and resultant spectrum scarcities threaten to make air, ground, and sea travel slower and less safe; construction, distribution, mining, and manufacturing more costly; data transmission and information processing networks harder to develop for wide use; and some potential advances in education, law enforcement, and national security difficult to realize. This silent crisis seems due at least as much to deficiencies in our allocational practices as to any inherent characteristics of the radio spectrum resource. Today, rights are awarded gratis by the Federal Communications Commission and the President's Office of Telecommunications Management. With right-holders prohibited from selling any portion, they lack incentives to economize use today, to withhold current use if greater future value will result, or to transfer rights to others who may value them more highly. Large portions of spectrum are allocated to different services with no chance for interservice transfers despite the sometimes permissive policies that govern intraservice usage [24, p. 271. Some consequences of this centralized nonprice system have been aptly described by the President's Task Force on Communications Policy: