Examining bank behavior around Federal Reserve stress tests, we find that stress test banks increase capital ratios at the starting point for annual stress testing significantly more than non-stress test banks. These trends are completely reversed (and economically significant) in the other quarters. Further, the differences between stress test and non-stress test banks seen in stress test years do not occur in 2010, when the Fed did not conduct a stress test. Results show that, as they enter the stress test, stress test banks lower dividends significantly more than non-stress test banks. Finally, stress test banks spend significantly more on lobbying than non-stress test banks. The results suggest that stress test banks may be managing financial performance and investing in political spending to improve their chances of passing stress tests.

Corporate bond mutual funds engage in liquidity transformation, raising concerns among academics and policy makers that large redemptions will lead to asset fire sales. We find little evidence, however, that bond fund redemptions drive fire sale price pressure after controlling for time-varying issuer-level information that could also affect funds’ trading decisions, using a novel identification strategy that exploits same-issuer bonds held by funds with differing outflows. We attribute our findings, which contrast with those found for equity funds, to funds’ liquidity management strategies. Bond funds maintain significant liquidity cushions and selectively trade liquid assets, allowing them to absorb investor redemption risk without excessively liquidating corporate bonds, even during the 2008 financial crisis.