This paper examines the impact of share repurchase tender offers on the market microstructure. We find that there is a temporary reduction in the bid–ask spread, and a temporary increase in volume and quotation depth during the offer period. Our evidence suggests that the bid–ask spread is asymmetric during the offer period with the bid-side spread smaller than the ask-side spread. The temporary reduction in the spread around offers is consistent with the competing-market-maker hypothesis which predicts that the intensified competition for the market maker raises bid prices and narrows the spread asymmetrically during the offer period.

We investigate the role of limit orders in the liquidity provision in a pure order‐driven market. Results show that market depth rises subsequent to an increase in transitory volatility, and transitory volatility declines subsequent to an increase in market depth. We also examine how transitory volatility affects the mix between limit orders and market orders. When transitory volatility arises from the ask (bid) side, investors will submit more limit sell (buy) orders than market sell (buy) orders. This result is consistent with the existence of limit‐order traders who enter the market and place orders when liquidity is needed.