This paper examines audit offices’ human capital investment in response to client restatement announcements and the resulting effects on audit quality and audit office client base. We find that audit offices attempt to acquire human capital and talent by posting more audit-related job positions just after a client announces a restatement. The increase in job postings follows restatements with more negative announcement returns and restatements of annual financial statements, and is concentrated among more senior and experienced positions. Importantly, the increased job postings are not driven by replacement hiring due to individual auditor departures and reflect more auditors joining the office. These human capital investments reduce future client misstatements and losses in client portfolios, indicating improvements in actual and perceived audit quality. Audit offices are also more likely to replace audit managing partners and prevent the signing partners of the misstated financial statements from signing new audit reports after restatement announcements.

We study how managers react to shareholder empowerment that makes votes on shareholder proposals binding. We empirically exploit staggered legislative changes that introduce such empowerment for proposals regarding majority voting in director elections. We find that managers become more responsive to shareholder requirements by initiating majority voting through either management proposals or governance guidelines. This early action crowds out shareholder proposals. Further results suggest compromised implementation: Managers adopt provisions that give them greater control over the channel of implementation and allow them to retain directors who fail in elections. Our results suggest that managers retain substantial discretion to modulate shareholder requirements. This article was partially completed when Wu was at Fudan University. Any errors are attributable solely to the authors.