This paper extends the spatial theory of voting to the case in which policy choices depend upon the interaction between executive and the legislature. Voters are strategic and to analyze equilibrium the authors apply 'coalition proof' type refinements. The model has implications consistent with voting behavior in the United States: (1) split-ticket with some voters choosing one party for the presidency and the other for Congress; (2) for some parameter values, a divided government with different parties controlling the executive and the majority of the legislature; and (3) the mid-term electoral cycle with the party holding the presidency always losing votes in mid-term legislative elections.

I. The setter's problem under certainty and the importance of the reversion point, 565.—II. Budget-maximizing with uncertain turnout, 571.—III. Exploiting a sequence of elections, 579.—IV. Implications for empirical research, 581.—Appendix, 585.

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of an agricultural economy in which poor farmers borrow from rich farmers. Because output is stochastic (we allow for idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks), there may be default ex post. We compare equilibria with and without political intervention. Intervention takes the form of a moratorium and is decided by voting. When bad economic shocks are highly likely, state‐contingent debt moratoria always improve ex post efficiency and may also improve ex ante efficiency. Moreover, the threat of moratoria enhances efficiency. When adverse macro shocks are unlikely, state‐contingent moratoria always improve ex ante welfare by completing incomplete debt contracts.

We estimate institutional investor preferences from proxy voting records. The W-NOMINATE method maps investors onto a left-right dimension based on votes for fiscal year 2012. Public pension funds and other investors on the left support a more social and environment-friendly orientation of the firm and fewer executive compensation proposals. “Money-conscious” investors appear on the right. The proxy advisor ISS makes voting recommendations that place it center, to the left of most large mutual funds. A second dimension reflects a more traditional governance view, with management-disciplinarian investors, the proxy advisor Glass Lewis among them, pitted against more management-friendly ones.