Using American Depositary Receipt (ADR) IPOs from 34 countries during 1980–2004, we find that, on average, the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces the underwriter gross spread by 49–61 basis points, which is about 10–12% of the average gross spread for ADR IPOs. This relation is present regardless of whether issuers have a prior listing or whether issuers are from developed or emerging markets. The association becomes stronger for ADRs underwritten by less prestigious underwriters and for issuers that are involved in privatization. The political institutions in the issuers’ home markets also affect gross spreads.

We examine the firm's choice between an SEO and a PIPE, an innovation in follow-on equity selling mechanism seen in the late 1990s. Our primary finding indicates that the rapid rise of the PIPE market fills the capital needs of firms which may not have access to more traditional alternatives. This lack of access is driven mainly by information asymmetry and weak operating performance. We also show that firms are more likely to choose PIPEs when the general market and the firm's stock are performing poorly. Furthermore, we find that selected firms with access to the public market may prefer a PIPE due to specific cost considerations.

We investigate how investment banks determine the gross spreads paid by American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from 1980 to 2004. We begin by comparing the gross spreads of ADR IPOs and ADR SEOs to those of matching US IPOs and US SEOs. We document clustering at the 7% level for our ADR IPO sample (44% for the ADR IPO firms without a previous equity listing), whereas our ADR SEO sample exhibits no discernable clustering at any level. We then find that ADR IPO gross spreads can be explained by firm and offer characteristics (similar to our matched sample of US IPOs), and by whether the ADR IPO firm has a previous equity listing. ADR SEO gross spreads can be explained more by offer characteristics (more similar to our matched sample of US SEOs).

This study examines the role of reputation stretching in the context of mutual funds. We show that the reputation stretching strategy increases net fund inflows to new funds run by well-performing fund managers and yields a net increase of fund inflows to fund families. Reputable fund managers exhibit one-year performance persistence for managing new funds, which can help investors assess managers when selecting funds. We also find that the decrease in information asymmetry associated with managerial reputation benefits investors by leading to an increase in new fund returns in the short run, compared to those of new funds run by managers without track records. Overall, the reputation stretching strategy benefits both investors, by reducing information asymmetry and improving investment returns, and fund families, by increasing net fund inflows to new equity funds.

Gross spreads received by underwriters on initial public offerings (IPOs) in the United States are much higher than in other countries. Furthermore, in recent years more than 90 percent of deals raising $20–80 million have spreads of exactly seven percent, three times the proportion of a decade earlier. Investment bankers readily admit that the IPO business is very profitable, and that they avoid competing on fees because they ‘don't want to turn it into a commodity business.’ We examine several features of the IPO underwriting business that result in a market structure where spreads are high.

This study investigates the relation between IPO underwriting and subsequent lending. We find that when a bank underwrites a firm’s IPO, the bank is more likely to provide the issuer with future loans at a lower cost, compared to banks without an IPO underwriting relationship. The evidence also suggests that the underwriting banks share information surplus with the IPO firms in the post-IPO loans, supporting the cost-saving hypothesis. Overall, the evidence for the relation between prior IPO underwriting and subsequent lending supports the notion that firms can derive value from investment bank relationships.

We examine whether investors can improve their investment opportunity sets through the addition of volatility-related assets into various groupings of benchmark portfolios. By first analyzing the weekly returns of three VIX-related assets over the period 1996–2008 and then applying mean–variance spanning tests, we find that adding VIX-related assets does lead to a statistically significant enlargement of the investment opportunity set for investors. Our empirical findings are robust and have two implications. First, there is scope for the further development of financial products relating to volatility indexes. Second, hedge fund managers can utilize VIX futures contracts or VIX-squared portfolios to enhance their equity portfolio performance, as measured by the Sharpe ratio.

This study adopts a new perspective, misvaluation, to explain corporate propensity to hold cash. We find a strong cross-sectional relationship between misvaluation and the propensity to hold cash, which can be attributed to firms' investment, cash dividends, and equity raising activities. We further show that the equity issuance channel is driven by both firm-initiated issuance activities and the exercise of employee stock options. The results are robust after controlling for endogeneity issues. Several additional robustness tests reject alternative explanations, such as precautionary motives, agency conflicts, near-term cash needs, and tax motives.

This article examines the role of pre-saved cash in helping financially constrained firms during the 2000 dot-com crash and the 2008 financial crisis, both of which were exogenous shocks to industrial firms. The results show that constrained firms tended to increase capital investments during these severe economic downturns if they had pre-saved more cash. Constrained firms instead exhibited lower excess returns and incurred higher likelihoods of financial distress during the severe downturns if they had saved less cash prior to the events. Firms that experienced the 2000 dot-com crash and saved cash thereafter were less likely to default during the 2008 financial crisis, indicating the existence and benefit of learning effects. This study supports a precautionary motive for cash savings, showing that pre-saved cash helps financially constrained firms fund investment and reduces the likelihood of financial distress during severe market downturns. It demonstrates that saving for a rainy day really is valuable.

This study uses the Google search volume index as a direct measure of investor attention to explore the connection between attention-grabbing information and fund flows, future performance, and the survivorship of newly issued funds. We find that investors often engage in attention-driven purchases of new funds that have captured their attention online. However, fund investors who conduct internet searches and make attention-driven purchases are less sophisticated and fail to allocate their capital for earning abnormal returns. We also find that attention-induced inflows can help sustain new funds in competitive fund markets via potential mitigation of mergers and liquidations. Our robustness checks show similar results for old funds, but attention-driven fund flows do not enhance the survival of old funds.