Contrary to conventional wisdom, growth stocks (i.e., low book‐to‐market stocks) do not have substantially higher future cash‐flow growth rates than value stocks, in both rebalanced and buy‐and‐hold portfolios. Efficiency growth, survivorship and look‐back biases, and the rebalancing effect help explain the results. These findings suggest that duration alone is unlikely to explain the value premium.

I argue that the reason the book-to-market effect is stronger in small stocks is because smaller stocks generally have shorter life expectancy and therefore shorter equity duration. I build a model in which the book-to-market effect is stronger in stocks with shorter life expectancy. Empirically, I use delisting probability as my proxy for life expectancy. The data support my model's central prediction and its additional implications for stock return and variance. My results provide a rational explanation for the heterogeneity of the book-to-market effect, evidence previously taken as support for behavioral explanations.

The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.

Investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and disappeared, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. If one believes that financial constraints have not disappeared, then investment-cash flow sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. The decline and disappearance are robust to considerations of R&D and cash reserves, and across groups of firms. The information content in cash flow regarding investment opportunities has declined, but measurement error in Tobin's q does not completely explain the patterns in investment-cash flow sensitivity. The decline and disappearance cannot be explained by changes in sample composition, corporate governance, or market power—and remain a puzzle.

We study whether the constraints on firms’ operations imposed by labor unions affect firms’ costs of equity. The cost of equity is significantly higher for firms in more unionized industries. This effect holds after controlling for several industry and firm characteristics, is robust to endogeneity concerns, and is not driven by omitted variables. Moreover, the unionization premium is stronger when unions face a more favorable bargaining environment and is highly countercyclical. Unionization is also positively related to various measures of operating leverage. Our findings suggest that labor unions increase firms’ costs of equity by decreasing firms’ operating flexibility.

We propose a naïve model averaging (NMA) method that averages the OLS out-of-sample forecasts and the historical means and produces mostly positive out-of-sample R2s for the variables significant in sample in forecasting market returns. Surprisingly, more sophisticated weighting schemes that combine the predictive variable and historical mean do not consistently perform better. With unstable economic relations and a limited sample size, sophisticated methods may lead to overfitting or be subject to more estimation errors. In such situations, our simple methods may work better. Model misspecification, rather than declining return predictability, likely explains the predictive performance of the NMA method.

We examine a simple measure of operating leverage: the ratio of fixed costs (measured by depreciation and amortization plus selling, general, and administrative expenses) to the market (or book) value of assets. We find that this measure of operating leverage positively predicts returns. This operating leverage measure is not explained by common factors and performs better than the traditional measures of operating leverage. Furthermore, an exploratory two-factor model with the operating leverage factor works at least as well as, but does not subsume, the Fama and French five-factor model.