Abstract We study a publicly traded firm that cares about its short-term stock market performance while collaborating with a privately owned firm in a business alliance. The firms each undertake a relation-specific investment and then bargain over the allocation of the joint surplus generated by the alliance. The public firm’s myopic market concerns affect both the total size of the surplus and how the firms divide the surplus. While the public firm always becomes more aggressive and obtains more of the surplus, the total size of the surplus may become larger or smaller, due to the effect of myopic market concerns on the firms’ investment incentives. We establish conditions under which the investment and the value of each firm increase or decrease with market concerns. The market concerns could mitigate or exacerbate the hold-up problem between the two firms and thus could either benefit or harm the whole business alliance. We also study two extensions with (i) the two investments being substitutes instead of complements and (ii) both firms being publicly listed. In both cases, the insights from our main model still hold.

Abstract Stock prices often provide firm managers with new information that can be used in real decisions. Studies generally focus on the ex ante disclosure policy and show that the presence of market feedback crowds out firms' disclosure. We instead examine a manager's ex post biasing incentives and find that market feedback amplifies overreporting bias, but not necessarily underreporting bias, due to three interacting effects. First, the manager biases the report more with feedback since decreased information quality crowds in the speculator's private information acquisition and improves investment efficiency, regardless of the reporting scenario (the information rationing effect). Second, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario, because reporting more favorable information crowds in private information acquisition, as the speculator expects a higher subsequent investment and therefore higher trading profits (the investment scale effect). Third, market feedback influences reporting bias not only through the speculator's information acquisition but also directly through the market maker's pricing function. Specifically, the market maker decreases the price discount, as he expects that the manager may learn correct information from the price and may invest more efficiently. Expecting a lower price penalty in the presence of feedback, the manager biases more in the overreporting scenario and less in the underreporting scenario (the investment correction effect). Overall, our results suggest that granting firms reporting discretion could improve investment efficiency and firm value when managers can learn through price.

ABSTRACT We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two‐period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision‐useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of the firm's financial performance provides the manager with another option to potentially conceal initial failure from the market. The interaction of these two options determines the manager's incentive to explore. In equilibrium, a myopic manager who cares about the interim market price may over‐ or under‐explore compared to the optimal exploration strategy that maximizes firm value. Our analysis shows that firms operating in an environment with voluntary disclosure early in the trial stage and mandated requirement later are most motivated to explore, while firms subject to early mandated disclosure and late voluntary disclosure are least likely to do so. We also provide empirical predictions about the link between the disclosure environment and the intensity and efficiency of corporate innovation.

ABSTRACT We formalize the concept of “dark matter” in asset pricing models by quantifying the additional informativeness of cross‐equation restrictions about fundamental dynamics. The dark‐matter measure captures the degree of fragility for models that are potentially misspecified and unstable: a large dark‐matter measure indicates that the model lacks internal refutability (weak power of optimal specification tests) and external validity (high overfitting tendency and poor out‐of‐sample fit). The measure can be computed at low cost even for complex dynamic structural models. To illustrate its applications, we provide quantitative examples applying the measure to (time‐varying) rare‐disaster risk and long‐run risk models.

ABSTRACT Market‐wide circuit breakers are trading halts aimed at stabilizing the market during dramatic price declines. Using an intertemporal equilibrium model, we show that a circuit breaker significantly alters market dynamics and affects investor welfare. As the market approaches the circuit breaker, price volatility rises drastically, accelerating the chance of triggering the circuit breaker—the so‐called “magnet effect,” returns exhibit increasing negative skewness, and trading activity spikes up. Our empirical analysis supports the model's predictions. Circuit breakers can affect overall welfare negatively or positively, depending on the relative significance of investors' trading motives for risk sharing versus irrational speculation.