Relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensates managers on their relative performance against a peer group. Since observing more peers’ performance allows managers to better estimate the performance level required to achieve RPE targets, we conjecture that releasing earnings later than peers facilitates managers to achieve targets by exploiting last-minute reporting discretion. Empirical evidence is consistent with our conjecture. Further, managers tend to select peers that release earnings more timely and delay own firms’ earnings releases to be later than peers’ after RPE adoption. Our evidence suggests strategic timing of earnings release and discretionary reporting in response to relative performance evaluation.

We use a large pictorial sample of Chinese financial analysts to test the association between facial width‐to‐height ratio ( fWHR ) and performance in men. Financial analysts offer an ideal setting for our investigation because we can objectively track individual analysts’ behaviors and performance. We find that high‐ fWHR analysts are more likely to conduct corporate site visits and they exhibit better performance. The positive fWHR –performance association survives a battery of robustness checks and the association is more pronounced for analysts with lower status, for firms with higher uncertainty, and for analysts facing more intense competition. Our results suggest that the dominant trait predicted by fWHR is achievement drive.

Government-controlled brokerage analysts serve as a market stabilization tool in China. Examining the 2005–2019 period, we show these analysts issue relatively more optimistic—yet less accurate and timely—forecasts during market rescue periods, supporting stock prices. During market booms, they issue comparatively pessimistic but more accurate and timely forecasts, tempering excessive optimism. These patterns are stronger for large firms and state-owned enterprises, and at the most government-influenced brokerages. Markets appear to respond to these forecasts: stocks with greater government-brokerage coverage experience higher liquidity during downturns but lower liquidity during hot markets, with corresponding post-earnings price adjustments. Our findings match Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong’s (2022) theoretical predictions: state interventions can erode information efficiency under intensive intervention while maintaining it under moderate intervention. Collectively, these results underscore that analysts can serve a dual role—as information providers and policy instruments shaping market expectations and stability—in a coordinated economy. Data Availability: The data used in this study were obtained from the China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) database under a commercial license and cannot be redistributed by the authors. Researchers can obtain equivalent data through institutional access to CSMAR.