This paper examines capital reallocation among firms in Korean business groups () in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the consequences of this capital reallocation for the investment and performance of firms. We show that transferred cash from low‐growth to high‐growth member firms, using cross‐firm equity investments. This capital reallocation allowed chaebol firms with greater investment opportunities to invest more than control firms after the crisis. These firms also showed higher profitability and lower declines in valuation than control firms following the crisis. Our results suggest that chaebol internal capital markets helped them mitigate the negative effects of the Asian crisis on investment and performance.

Corporations have accumulated record amounts of cash. We study whether firms’ cash retention has been excessive by examining a Korean reform that introduced a new tax on earnings retained as cash. Difference-in-differences tests show that treated firms reduce cash retention and instead increase payouts and investments. Market participants react favorably to the reform, consistent with excessive cash retention. The valuation effects and the alternative uses of the cash are associated with behavioral and agency frictions. Firms that are more subject to behavioral biases increase payouts and experience higher valuations, while poorly governed firms allocate more to investment and experience relatively lower valuations.