Disclosures play an apparently critical role in the empirical regularity of the short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal in stock returns. Motivated by this evidence, this paper integrates an analysis of disclosures within an asset pricing model to arrive at a framework in which disclosures and asset returns are jointly determined. Disclosures resolve uncertainty, but the increased information flow also raises the risks during the disclosure period. When disclosures and asset returns are modeled jointly, apparently good news is associated with the upward revision of future disclosure risks. The model generates predictions that have the outward appearance of short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal.

Public information in financial markets often arrives through the disclosures of interested parties who have a material interest in the reactions of the market to the new information. When the strategic interaction between the sender and the receiver is formalized as a disclosure game with verifiable reports, equilibrium prices can be given a simple characterization in terms of the concatenation of binomial pricing trees. There are a number of empirical implications. The theory predicts that the return variance following a poor disclosed outcome is higher than it would have been if the disclosed outcome were good. Also, when investors are risk averse, this leads to negative serial correlation of asset returns. Other points of contact with the empirical literature are discussed. Copyright The Econometric Society 2003.

The availability of credit varies over the business cycle through shifts in the leverage of financial intermediaries. Empirically, we find that intermediary leverage is negatively aligned with the banks' Value-at-Risk (VaR). Motivated by the evidence, we explore a contracting model that captures the observed features. Under general conditions on the outcome distribution given by extreme value theory (EVT), intermediaries maintain a constant probability of default to shifts in the outcome distribution, implying substantial deleveraging during downturns. For some parameter values, we can solve the model explicitly, thereby endogenizing the VaR threshold probability from the contracting problem.

This paper explores the pricing of debt in a financial system where the assets that borrowers hold to meet their obligations include claims against other borrowers. Assessing financial claims in a system context captures features that are missing in a partial equilibrium setting, such as liquidity spillovers across financial institutions resulting from expansions and contractions of balance sheets. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of growth of financial sector balance sheets.

Even though self-fulfilling currency attacks lead to multiple equilibria when fundamentals are common knowledge, we demonstrate the uniqueness of equilibrium when speculators face a small amount of noise in their signals about the fundamentals. This unique equilibrium depends not only on the fundamentals, but also on financial variables, such as the quantity of hot money in circulation and the costs of speculative trading. In contrast to multiple equilibrium models, our model allows analysis of policy proposals directed at curtailing currency attacks.

This paper compares the performance of a decentralized market with that of a dealership market when traders have differential information. Trade occurs as a result of equilibrium actions in a Bayesian game, where uncertainty is captured by a finite state space and information is represented by partitions on this space. In the benchmark case of trade with common knowledge of endowments, the two mechanisms deliver virtually identical outcomes. However, with differential information, the dealership market has strictly higher trading volume, and yields an efficient post-trade allocation in most states. In contrast, the decentralized market suffers from suboptimal trading volume. The reason for this poor performance is the vulnerability of the decentralized market to higher-order uncertainty concerning the fundamentals of the market. Traders may know that mutually beneficial trade is feasible, and perhaps know that they know, and yet a failure of common knowledge that this is so precludes efficient trade. The dealership market is robust to this type of uncertainty.

In a financial market where traders are risk averse and short lived and prices are noisy, asset prices today depend on the average expectation today of tomorrow's price. Thus (iterating this relationship) the date 1 price equals the date 1 average expectation of the date 2 average expectation of the date 3 price. This will not, in general, equal the date 1 average expectation of the date 3 price. We show how this failure of the law of iterated expectations for average belief can help understand the role of higher-order beliefs in a fully rational asset pricing model.

[What is the effect of financial crises and their resolution on banks' choice of liquidity? When banks have relative expertise in employing risky assets, the market for these assets clears only at fire-sale prices following a large number of bank failures. The gains from acquiring assets at fire-sale prices make it attractive for banks to hold liquid assets. The resulting choice of bank liquidity is countercyclical, inefficiently low during economic booms but excessively high during crises. We present evidence consistent with these predictions. While interventions to resolve banking crises may be desirable ex post, they affect bank liquidity in subtle ways: Liquidity support to failed banks or unconditional support to surviving banks reduces incentives to hold liquidity, whereas support to surviving banks conditional on their liquid asset holdings has the opposite effect.]

One aim of post-crisis monetary policy has been to ease credit conditions for borrowers by unlocking bank lending. We find that bank equity is an important determinant of both the bank's funding cost and its lending growth. In a cross-country bank-level study, we find that a 1 percentage point increase in the equity-to-total assets ratio is associated with a four basis point reduction in the cost of debt financing and with a 0.6 percentage point increase in annual loan growth. These findings suggest that greater retention of bank earnings and hence higher bank capital would have aided the transmission of accommodative monetary policy to ease financial conditions faced by ultimate borrowers. In particular, we find that the effects of a monetary tightening are smaller for banks with higher capitalization, which have easier access to uninsured financing. These results suggest that if the banking system as a whole is weakly capitalized, there may be some tension between the monetary policy imperative of unlocking bank lending (i.e., expanding credit) and the supervisory objective of ensuring the soundness of individual banks (i.e., shrinking credit).