I examine how the labor market in which firms operate affects their capital structure decisions. Based on US Census Bureau data and information on companies’ decisions to locate their new operations, I use a large plant opening as an abrupt increase in the size of a local labor market. I find that a new plant opening leads to an increase of 2.5–3.9 percentage points in the debt-to-capital ratio of existing firms in the “winner” county relative to the “runner-up” choice. This result is consistent with the argument that larger labor markets make job loss less costly, which in turn reduces the indirect costs of financial distress. Notably, this spillover effect is larger for firms that employ the same type of workers as the new plant in the affected county.

This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms experience stagnation in work hours and wages despite an increase in labor productivity. Additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, management's voluntary reforms, industry consolidation shocks, or activists' stock-picking abilities.

This paper examines how uncertainty affects corporate investment under varying degrees of asset redeployability. We develop new measures of asset redeployability by accounting for the usability of assets within and across industries. We identify plausibly exogenous shocks to economic uncertainty by using major economic and political events. We find that after an increase in uncertainty, firms using less redeployable capital reduce investment more. More redeployable assets exhibit higher recovery rates and are traded more actively in secondary markets. Overall, our results suggest that frictions in redeploying assets affect liquidation values and therefore make firms cautious about investment decisions under uncertainty.

This paper studies the long-term effect of hedge fund activism on firm productivity using plant-level information from the U.S. Census Bureau. A typical target firm improves production efficiency in the 3 years after intervention, with stronger improvements in business strategy-oriented interventions. Plants sold after intervention improve productivity significantly under new ownership, suggesting that capital redeployment is an important channel for value creation. Employees of target firms experience stagnation in work hours and wages despite an increase in labor productivity. Additional tests refute alternative explanations attributing the improvement to mean reversion, management's voluntary reforms, industry consolidation shocks, or activists' stock-picking abilities.

We examine CEO-board dynamics using a new panel dataset that spans 1920 to 2011. The long sample allows us to perform within-firm and within-CEO tests over a long horizon, many for the first time in the governance literature. Consistent with theories of bargaining or dynamic contracting, we find board independence increases at CEO turnover and falls with CEO tenure, with the decline stronger following superior performance. CEOs are also more likely to be appointed board chair as tenure increases, and we find evidence consistent with a substitution between board independence and chair duality. Other results suggest that these classes of models fail to capture important elements of board dynamics. First, the magnitude of the CEO tenure effect is economically small, much smaller, for example, than the strong persistence in board structure that we show. Second, when external CEOs are hired, board independence falls and subsequently increases. Third, event studies show a positive market reaction when powerful CEOs die in office, consistent with powerful CEOs becoming entrenched.

We show how uncertainty shapes corporate asset allocation, composition, and productivity using data from the shipping industry. Firms curtail both ship acquisitions and disposals when uncertainty increases, primarily through cuts in new ship orders and ship demolitions — decisions that are costlier to reverse vis-à-vis secondary market transactions. Uncertainty also prompts firms to concentrate their fleets into narrower, less productive portfolios. We corroborate our findings using the 2009–2011 spike in Somali pirate attacks as an uncertainty shock to shipping activity. Uncertainty hampers “creative destruction,” slowing both the adoption of innovation embodied in new capital and the disposal of old capital.

We implement a field experiment to examine how part-time work attracts applicants with different productivity than full-time work. In a large-scale recruitment drive for a data-entry position in Ethiopia, either a part-time or full-time job opportunity was randomly offered. We find that part-time work attracts less qualified applicants with lower productivity but stronger preferences for short work hours. Our estimates show this selection effect may explain about half of the typical part-time wage penalty, which is about 25%. A simple model demonstrates how lack of high-quality workers with strong preference for short work hours could explain the experimental findings.

An employee's annual earnings fall by 13% in the first full calendar year after her firm's bankruptcy, and the present value of lost earnings from bankruptcy to six years following bankruptcy is 87% of pre‐bankruptcy annual earnings. More worker earnings are lost in thin labor markets and among small firms. Ex ante compensating wage differentials for this “bankruptcy risk” are up to 2% of firm value for a firm whose credit rating falls from AA to BBB, comparable in magnitude to debt tax benefits. Thus, wage premia for expected costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently large to be an important consideration in capital structure decisions.