The paper analyzes the experiences and developments of Hungarian banking sector during the transitional process from a centralized economy to a market-oriented system. The paper identifies that early reorganization initiatives, flexible approaches to privatization, and liberal policies towards foreign banks’ involvement with the domestic institutions helped to build a relatively stable and increasingly efficient banking system. Foreign banks and banks with higher foreign bank ownership involvement were associated with lower inefficiency.

This paper investigates the existence and extent of economies of scale and scope among the stock exchanges. Evidence from 38 exchanges in 32 countries and 4 continents around the world for the years 1989–1998 portrays the existence of significant economies of scale and scope. The degree of such scale and scope however differs across size and regions. The largest exchanges show an increasing trend of cost effectiveness. The exchanges in North America and Europe report substantially higher economies of scale relative to the exchanges in the Asia-Pacific regions.

Prior research has demonstrated that CEOs learn privileged information from their social connections. Going beyond the importance of the number of social ties in a CEO's social network, this paper studies the value generated from a diverse social environment. We construct an index of social-network heterogeneity (SNH) that captures the extent to which CEOs are connected to people of different demographic attributes and skill sets. We find that higher CEO SNH leads to greater firm value through the channels of better corporate innovation and diversified M&As. Overall, the evidence suggests that CEOs' exposure to human diversity enhances social learning and creates greater growth opportunities for firms.

In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to withdraw. An improvement in the transparency of a bank may reduce depositor welfare by increasing the chance of an inefficient contagious run on other banks. A deposit insurance system in which some depositors are fully insured and the others are partially insured can ameliorate this inefficiency. Under such a system, bank runs can serve as an efficient mechanism for disciplining banks. We also consider bank managers' control over the timing of information disclosure, and find that bank managers may use their influence to eliminate both inefficient and efficient bank runs.

This paper takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on bank risk. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that banks’ financial stability increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions, liberalize banking, and restructure corporate governance. We also find that the effects of legal and governance reforms on bank risk may critically depend on the progress of banking reforms. A further examination of alternative risk measures reveals that the increases in financial stability among banks mainly come from the reduction of asset risk. Banks tend to have lower ROA volatility and fewer nonperforming loans after reforming the institutional environment. Finally, we split our sample into foreign and domestic banks and find that the enhancement of financial stability is more pronounced for domestic banks.

This paper stresses the importance of understanding operational choices, strategies, and performances of stock exchanges as regular operating firms [J. Finance 52 (1999) 655; J. Financial Markets 2 (1999) 329]. Using unbalanced panel data on 49 stock exchanges over the period 1989–1998, the paper traces the productivity of stock exchanges over time and across different types and groups of exchanges. We find significant variability in productivity – revenue and cost efficiency – across these exchanges. On average, North American exchanges are found to be most cost and revenue efficient. However, our findings also indicate that European exchanges have improved the most, in respect of cost efficiency, while exchanges in South America and Asia-Pacific are found to be lagging as regards both cost and revenue estimations. Evidence also indicates that investment in technology-related developments effectively influenced cost and revenue efficiency. Moreover, organisational structure and market competition are found to be significantly associated with both cost and revenue efficiency for the exchanges studied, whereas market size and quality are related only to revenue efficiency.

Using data from 1996 to 2000, we investigate the effects of ownership, especially by a strategic foreign owner, on bank efficiency for eleven transition countries in an unbalanced panel consisting of 225 banks and 856 observations. Applying stochastic frontier estimation procedures, we compute profit and cost efficiency taking account of both time and country effects directly. In second-stage regressions, we use the efficiency measures along with return on assets to investigate the influence of ownership type. With respect to the impact of ownership, we conclude that privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency as government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than domestic private banks. We find that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient than other banks and that they also provide better service, in particular if they have a strategic foreign owner. The remaining government-owned banks are less efficient in providing services, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the better banks were privatized first in transition countries.