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Bank performance, efficiency and ownership in transition countries

Journal of Banking & Finance 2005 29(1), 31-53 open access
Using data from 1996 to 2000, we investigate the effects of ownership, especially by a strategic foreign owner, on bank efficiency for eleven transition countries in an unbalanced panel consisting of 225 banks and 856 observations. Applying stochastic frontier estimation procedures, we compute profit and cost efficiency taking account of both time and country effects directly. In second-stage regressions, we use the efficiency measures along with return on assets to investigate the influence of ownership type. With respect to the impact of ownership, we conclude that privatization by itself is not sufficient to increase bank efficiency as government-owned banks are not appreciably less efficient than domestic private banks. We find that foreign-owned banks are more cost-efficient than other banks and that they also provide better service, in particular if they have a strategic foreign owner. The remaining government-owned banks are less efficient in providing services, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the better banks were privatized first in transition countries.

Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries

Journal of Banking & Finance 2005 29(8-9), 2155-2178 open access
To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, we take the largest banks in six relatively advanced countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics and efficiency measures computed from stochastic frontiers are compared across four bank ownership types. Our empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government-owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that foreign banks cherry pick the most profitable opportunities, we find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee-for-service business. Finally, we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to performance; specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks, even though we find no evidence of a selection effect.