In this paper, I examine the effects of failed mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals on firms' disclosure decisions. As a firm's detailed proprietary information is shared with the counterparty during an M&A deal, the value of the information is expected to decrease if the deal fails. As a result, it may become less costly for the firm to publicly disclose the information. Consistent with this reasoning, I find increased disclosure of proprietary information in the year after firms experience failed deals. Evidence from cross‐sectional tests and a quasi‐natural experiment strengthens this inference. I also show that investor information demand contributes to the increased disclosure of proprietary information after failed deals. In addition, consistent with an increase in proprietary information provided to investors, I find reduced information asymmetry after failed deals. Finally, I document diminished future performance among firms that increase the disclosure of proprietary information after failed deals. Overall, my study sheds light on how failed deals impact firms' disclosure decisions, information environment, and future performance.

We examine how analysts’ information acquisition and processing differ when analysts have access to AI resources, focusing on investment banks’ AI investments. We propose and test a two‐step framework, which is informed by in‐depth interviews with analysts. First, consistent with AI facilitating automation‐assisted public information processing, we show that AI investments are associated with more timely earnings forecasts following 10‐K filings, particularly after the implementation of iXBRL, which increases the machine readability of filings. Second, we show that analysts reallocate the time and capacity freed by automation toward acquiring and incorporating private information, supported by several sets of evidence: AI investments (1) are associated with higher quality and bolder earnings forecasts, particularly when private information is more important and accessible to analysts; (2) are associated with an expansion of analyst coverage to new firms and industries; and (3) are associated with higher information‐seeking efforts, particularly greater participation in earnings conference calls. Additionally, exploiting the launch of AskResearchGPT at Morgan Stanley, an in‐house generative AI designed for research, we find results consistent with our main analyses. Overall, our study provides insights into the potential for AI to reshape the human value of sell‐side analysts.

We examine the effects of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act's (TCJA) interest deduction limitation on suppliers. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, we find that suppliers with customers subject to the limitation (“affected suppliers”) report increased accounts receivable of between 11.2% and 14.9% relative to their pre‐TCJA average accounts receivable. Using a triple differences design, we provide more granular evidence by documenting that the limitation's effects on affected suppliers' accounts receivable are driven by suppliers with customers that report increased trade credit use (i.e., higher accounts payable). In cross‐sectional analyses, we find that the effects are stronger when suppliers are smaller, have higher peer product similarity, operate in industries with low entry barriers, or are in the early stage of their life cycle, consistent with suppliers with weaker bargaining power providing more trade credit to customers compared to other suppliers. Turning to supplier consequences of increased accounts receivable, we find that affected suppliers' days sales outstanding and operating cycles increase. Next, we use path analyses to find that affected suppliers experience lower cash flows and higher risks due to their increased accounts receivable. Overall, our study provides evidence that the interest deduction limitation yielded externalities on affected firms' supply chains.

The revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) requires the unbundling of research payments from trading execution, fundamentally changing the way in which investors typically pay for analyst research in Europe. We examine the effectiveness of the regulation in changing the link between analyst research and trading, the research‐trading link, and the analyst response to this potential change in incentives. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy are less associated with the brokerage trading share after MiFID II, suggesting that MiFID II weakened the link between the brokerage share of trading and analyst research. Following MiFID II, analysts in Europe are less likely than analysts in the United States to continue high forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy for stocks with high share importance for the analyst's brokerage house. We find similar results throughout for buy/sell recommendations. Overall, our evidence suggests that MiFID II is at least partially successful in unbundling research from execution, and impacts both the trading effects and the production of analyst research.

The protection of free speech enhances the ability of various public stakeholders to disseminate privately observed adverse information about public firms, making it difficult for corporate managers to conceal negative information about their companies. Using the staggered enactment of anti‐strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti‐SLAPP) laws across U.S. states as a shock that strengthens free speech protection, we show that stronger protection is associated with less concealment of bad news. This is evidenced by a lower likelihood of stock price crashes, a decreased probability of accounting fraud, and an increased frequency of firm‐initiated negative press releases. These results are more pronounced for states with stronger anti‐SLAPP laws and where such laws are likely to be more influential. Moreover, the impact of free speech protection on bad news concealment is more significant for firms with greater ex ante incentives to conceal negative information. Further analyses suggest that free speech protection likely enhances the ability of short sellers, employees, and the media, among others, to reveal bad news about public firms. Finally, we find evidence that strengthened free speech protection also improves financial reporting quality. Our study highlights the importance of free speech protection in enhancing corporate transparency.