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Does shareholder coordination matter? Evidence from private placements

Journal of Financial Economics 2013 108(1), 213-230
We propose a new role for private investments in public equity (PIPEs) as a mechanism to reduce coordination frictions among existing equity holders. We establish a causal link between the coordination ability of incumbent shareholders and PIPE issuance. This result obtains even after controlling for alternative explanations such as information asymmetry and access to public markets. Improved equity coordination following a private placement leads to favorable debt renegotiations within one year of issuance. Mitigating coordination frictions among shareholders ultimately decreases the odds of firm default in half.

Credit Default Swaps and Lender Incentives in Bank Debt Renegotiations

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2023 58(5), 1911-1942 open access
Using a regression-discontinuity design and within lender–borrower variation, we analyze how credit default swaps (CDSs) affect bank incentives and borrower outcomes in renegotiations after covenant violations. While existing studies document an investment decline after covenant violations, we find that covenant-violating firms maintain their investment subsequent to the introduction of CDS trading. Moreover, after CDS introduction, covenant-violating firms are less likely to default. Our results suggest that in the private debt markets, CDSs discipline borrowers, while the empty creditor problem due to CDS is mitigated because of lenders’ reputation concerns and lower coordination frictions.

Monetary stimulus and bank lending

Journal of Financial Economics 2020 136(1), 189-218
The US Federal Reserve purchased both agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasury securities to conduct quantitative easing. Using micro-level data, we find that banks benefiting from MBS purchases increase mortgage origination, compared with other banks. At the same time, these banks reduce commercial lending and firms that borrow from these banks decrease investment. The effect of Treasury purchases is different: either positive or insignificant in most cases. Our results suggest that MBS purchases caused unintended real effects and that Treasury purchases did not cause a large positive stimulus to the economy through the bank lending channel.

Housing Price Booms and Crowding-Out Effects in Bank Lending

Review of Financial Studies 2018 31(7), 2806-2853
Analyzing the period 1988–2006, we document that banks that are active in strong housing markets increase mortgage lending and decrease commercial lending. Firms that borrow from these banks have significantly lower investment. This is especially pronounced for firms that are more capital constrained or borrow from more-constrained banks. Various extensions and robustness analyses are consistent with the interpretation that commercial loans were crowded out by banks responding to profitable opportunities in mortgage lending, rather than with a demand-based interpretation. The results suggest that housing prices appreciations have negative spillovers to the real economy, which were overlooked thus far. Received November 29, 2016; editorial decision January 12, 2018 by Editor David Hirshleifer.

Financial Statement Complexity and Bank Lending

The Accounting Review 2022 97(3), 155-178
Recent evidence suggests that investors struggle to process complex financial disclosures. Relative to equity and public debt investors, banks have unique advantages in acquiring information and can impose contractual terms to mitigate information frictions. We investigate whether financial statement complexity is associated with firms' reliance on bank financing and the terms of bank loans. We focus on two aspects of complexity: the length of financial reports and the complexity of financial reporting rules. We document that both aspects of complexity are positively associated with firms' reliance on bank financing (i.e., level of debt and new financing). This result is consistent with banks' superior information processing capabilities. Next, we document that banks ameliorate information frictions using loan contractual terms that depend on the source of complexity. Overall, banks are an attractive source of financing for firms with complex disclosures, but banks also increase screening and monitoring for relatively complex borrowers. Data Availability: Data used in this study are available from public sources identified in the study.