Global turnover in foreign exchange markets averaged $1.2 trillion per day according to the most recent estimates available from the Bank for International Settlements. 1 Yet, cross-border trade of goods and services accounts for less than 5 percent of the total trading. While it is difficult to get precise estimates on hedging, roughly 20 percent of total trading is aimed at hedging against future exchange rate changes. The remaining roughly 75 percent of total turnover in global foreign exchange markets is believed to be related to short or long term exchange rate speculation. The large fraction of global turnover in currency markets that is unrelated to trade or hedging has lead economists and policy markets to the conjecture that speculation is responsible for the perceived recent increase in volatility in foreign exchange markets. Several economists, most prominently Nobel Laureate Dr. James Tobin, have advocated levying a tax (a "Tobin tax") on foreign exchange transactions to reduce volatility induced by exchange rate speculation. Recently, several European countries spearheaded by France have debated a proposed legislation to impose a tax on currency transactions. 2 However, to date, there is no strong empirical evidence that an increase in transactions costs (which would be the result of a Tobin tax) would significantly dampen volatility. On the contrary, This is the first piece of legislation in the world that would implement a Tobin-type tax. Belgium passed similar legislation in March, 2002, and several other European Union member countries have debated a Tobin tax. See www.currencytax.org.

This article uses unique data from the London Stock Exchange to examine how trader anonymity and market liquidity affect dealers' decisions about where to place interdealer trades. During our sample period, dealers could trade with each other in the direct, nonanonymous public market or use one of four anonymous brokered trading systems. Surprisingly, we find that adverse selection is less prevalent in the anonymous brokered markets. We show that this pattern can be explained by the way dealers "price" the adverse selection risk inherent in trading with other dealers. We also relate our findings to recent changes in dealer markets.

This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.

[This article analyzes intraday patterns for U.K. and U.S. trading of British cross-listed stocks. For each market, the intraday patterns for these stocks closely resemble those of otherwise similar, non-cross-listed stocks. There is a 2-hour period each day when cross-listed stocks are traded both in New York and in London. This overlap is characterized by concentrated trading as private information, originating in New York, gets incorporated into prices in both markets. Cross-border competition for orderflow tends to reduce already declining spreads in London. By contrast, New York specialists maintain high spreads during the overlap. Overall, the evidence indicates that order flow for cross-listed securities is segmented.]

We use unique data from the London Stock Exchange to test whether interdealer trade facilitates inventory risk sharing among dealers. We develop a methodology that focuses on periods of “extreme” inventories—inventory cycles. We further distinguish between inventory cycles that are unanticipated and those that are anticipated because of “worked” orders. The pattern of interdealer trade during inventory cycles matches theoretical predictions for the direction of trade and the inventories of trade counterparts. We also show that London dealers receive higher trading revenues for taking larger positions.

Studying a comprehensive sample of stocks from the U.S. OTC market, we show that this market is a large and diverse trading environment with a rich set of regulatory and disclosure regimes, comprising venue rules and state laws beyond SEC regulation. We exploit this institutional richness to show that OTC firms subject to stricter regulatory regimes and disclosure requirements have higher market quality (higher liquidity and lower crash risk). Our analysis points to an important trade-off in regulating the OTC market and protecting investors: lowering regulatory requirements reduces the compliance burden for smaller firms, but it also reduces market quality.

[We examine short selling in US stocks based on new SEC-mandated data for 2005. There is a tremendous amount of short selling in our sample: short sales represent 24% of NYSE and 31% of Nasdaq share volume. Short sellers increase their trading following positive returns and they correctly predict future negative abnormal returns. These patterns are robust to controlling for voluntary liquidity provision and for opportunistic risk-bearing by short sellers. The results are consistent with short sellers trading on short-term overreaction of stock prices. A trading strategy based on daily short-selling activity generates significant positive returns during the sample period.]

We argue that competition between dealers in a classic dealer market is intertemporal: A trader identifies a particular dealer and negotiates a final price with only the intertemporal threat to switch dealers imposing pricing discipline on the dealer. In this kind of market structure, we show that dealers will offer greater price improvement to more regular customers, and, in turn, these customers optimally choose to submit larger orders. Hence, price improvement and trade size should be negatively correlated in a dealer market. We confirm our model's predictions using unique data from the London Stock Exchange during 1991.