We study how access to private equity financing affects real firm activities using a broad panel of publicly traded U.S. firms that raise external equity through private placements (PIPEs) between 1995 and 2008. The public firms relying on PIPEs are generally small, high-tech firms that cannot finance investment internally and likely face severe external financing constraints; PIPEs are by far the most important source of finance for these firms. We show that firms use PIPE inflows to maintain extremely high R&D investment ratios and to build substantial cash reserves. We also use GMM techniques that control for firm-specific effects and the endogeneity of the decision to raise private equity and find that PIPE funding has a substantial impact on corporate investment in cash reserves and R&D, and a smaller but significant impact on investment in non-cash working capital, but little impact on fixed investment or acquisitions. Our estimates indicate that R&D investment initially increases by 0.20–0.25 for each dollar of private equity flowing into the firm, and that PIPE funds initially invested in cash ultimately go to R&D. These findings offer direct evidence that access to private equity finance has an important effect on the key input that drives innovation at the firm- and economy-wide levels.

Financial relationships can alleviate the adverse effects of asymmetric information and agency costs on outside stakeholders. We examine announcement returns to PIPE transactions, conditional on the contract terms and identity of the investor. We find that the influence of contract terms on announcement returns depends on investor identity. For PIPEs with hedge fund investors, the inclusion of control terms associates with much larger announcement returns. In contrast, announcement returns for PIPEs, involving strategic investors, are less dependent on the existence of control terms. We find the opposite for liquidity terms. Namely, announcement returns are dramatically different for strategic investors with and without liquidity terms, while inclusion of liquidity terms is less influential when PIPEs involve hedge funds. Our findings suggest that investor identity and contract terms jointly influence market reactions to PIPEs.

A reverse merger allows a private company to assume the current reporting status of another company that is public. This can be done quickly, without fundraising, road show, underwriter, substantial ownership dilution, or great expense. Private firms that go public via reverse merger are often motivated by the need to quickly secure financing through privately placed stock (PIPEs) and the desire to make acquisitions using stock as payment. In each of the last eight years reverse mergers have outnumbered traditional IPOs as a mechanism for going public, and reporting shell companies are providing fuel for much of this growth. We study 585 trading shell companies over the period 2006–2008. The purpose of most of these shell firms is to find a suitor for a reverse merger agreement. These companies have no systematic risk, operations, or assets, and their share price tends to decline over time. Yet, these firms have investors. When a takeover agreement is consummated, shell company three-month abnormal returns are 48.1%. We argue that this exceptional return is compensation to investors for shell stock illiquidity and the uncertainty of finding a reverse merger suitor. We show that shell company returns are much greater at the consummation of a merger than those of a similar entity that in dollar terms is more popular among investors — Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs).

We examine the effects on IPO uncertainty of an alternative going-public mechanism – the two-stage IPO, where a firm first gets quoted on the OTC market, and then upgrades to a national exchange where it first issues public equity. We find that a two-stage IPO firm experiences lower underpricing and return volatility than does a similar traditional IPO firm. Our study is the first to analyze the impact of U.S. pre-IPO disclosure and liquidity on levels of uncertainty and pricing at the IPO stage. We find that greater disclosure and liquidity during the first stage leads to greater reduction in IPO uncertainty. We control for the potentially endogenous nature of the two-stage IPOs by using a difference-in-difference analysis that utilizes two exogenous OTC market events.

We introduce the idea of cross‐regulatory disclosure avoidance, whereby firms attempt to counteract expansions of disclosure under one regulation through actions that reduce disclosure under a different one. We study whether firms redact information from material contracts when they face new rules to disclose segment information. Using SFAS No. 131 as a plausibly exogenous shock to segment disclosure, we find that firms increasing the number of reported segments after the rule change exhibit a greater increase in redaction than firms maintaining the same number of segments. Consistent with proprietary cost motives, the increases are concentrated among firms with greater divergence in profitability across segments, higher abnormal segment profitability, and more negative abnormal stock returns in response to the finalization of the rule. Also, treated firms that redact after the rule change have abnormally profitable segments that they previously did not disclose. Firms that observables predict would increase redaction but did not experience declines in sales growth and profit margin. We find no evidence that agency cost motives drive the increases in redaction or, more generally, nondisclosure of segment performance before SFAS No. 131.

This study examines why private equity issues tend to be a repeated source of financing for public firms. We test the recent operational needs theory of public equity issuance within the context of repeated private equity issues. We find that repeated PIPE issuers burn through cash quickly and do not reach the standards of information transparency or profitability needed for a successful public equity offering. This has implications for investor composition and the market response to a PIPE. Initial PIPE offerings are characterized by substantial diversity in investor type. In successive transactions firms increasingly rely upon hedge funds, who extract greater price discounts and more often require cash flow rights as opposed to control rights. As firms select a path of repeated PIPEs to raise funds, successive issues become uninformative to the market. We conclude that, for small public firms, the same motive underlies public equity offerings and repeated private equity offerings—an acute need for cash.

We study at-the-market (ATM) equity offerings, which are direct share issuances sold in the secondary market that forgo underwriters and “dribble-out” shares over time rather than raising them all at once. Enabled in 2008, their use has increased dramatically, and in 2016, their incidence and total proceeds were, respectively, 63% and 26% of those for seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Determinants of firms’ choice between ATMs and SEOs are consistent with the costly certification hypothesis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). We also find that 65% of ATM proceeds are used to stockpile cash compared to 84% of SEO proceeds.

Nearly 40% of IPO firms redact information from their SEC registration filings. These firms exhibit characteristics consistent with the need to shield proprietary information from potential rivals. They experience greater underpricing, but pre-IPO insiders reduce underpricing-related wealth transfers by selling proportionately less of the firm's shares at the IPO, raising more equity financing in later seasoned equity offerings, and selling their own holdings at a relatively slow pace. The information environment of redacting firms reflects proportionately more private information than that of non-redacting firms post-IPO, but this difference abates by the fourth year. Consistent with the view that redacted proprietary information provides competitive advantages, redacting firms exhibit superior financial performance post-IPO. The results illustrate tradeoffs in balancing a firm's needs to protect proprietary information with its capital needs, investor needs for information to price securities, and pre-IPO owner liquidity needs.