We estimate a matching model of teachers and elementary schools with rich data on teachers' applications and principals' ratings from a large, urban district in North Carolina. Both teachers’ and principals’ preferences deviate from those that would maximize the achievement of economically disadvantaged students: teachers prefer schools with fewer disadvantaged students, and principals' ratings are weakly related to teacher effectiveness. In equilibrium, these two deviations combine to produce a surprisingly equitable current allocation, where teacher quality is balanced across advantaged and disadvantaged students. To close achievement gaps, policies that address deviations on one side alone are ineffective or harmful, while policies that address both could substantially increase the achievement of disadvantaged students.

We quantify the employer's role in unemployment insurance (UI) take-up. Employer effects on claiming and appeals are substantial, and those effects are negatively correlated, consistent with appeals deterring claims. Low-wage workers are less likely to claim and more likely to have their claims appealed than median-wage workers. Employer effects help explain these income gradients, so equalizing employer effects on claiming would increase the progressivity of UI. Finally, the main source of targeting error in UI is that eligible workers do not claim.