Variable annuities, the largest liability of U.S. life insurers, are investment products containing long-dated minimum return guarantees. I show that guarantees with similar economic risks are treated differently by regulation and these differences impact insurers’ hedging behavior. When the regulatory regime recognizes certain risks, insurers start to hedge these risks in a substantial way. For some guarantees, this involves hedging both interest rate and equity market risks. However, for others, it involves hedging only equity market risk. As the regulatory regime still does not recognize the interest rate risk of all guarantees, insurers remain exposed to substantial interest rate risk.

Homeowners insurance is central to managing the rising losses from climate‐related disasters. We show that insurance premiums are subject to starkly different regulations across states, creating persistent cross‐subsidies and price distortions. We employ states' regulatory rules in an instrumental variable estimation and a border discontinuity design to show insurers do not adjust rates in highly regulated states and compensate by raising rates in less regulated states. Rates and risks diverge in the long run, distorting cross‐state risk‐sharing and increasing insurer exits from highly regulated states. We argue these patterns stem from the interactions between rate regulation and insurers' financing constraints.

We propose an equilibrium corporate bond pricing model that accommodates the heterogeneity in institutional investors’ preferences and mandates in an empirically tractable way. Our model, estimated on rich holdings data, quantifies investors’ preferences and demand elasticities, with inelastic insurers focusing on the investment-grade segment, and elastic mutual funds substituting across ratings groups. The model offers a novel quantitative perspective of the effect of recent trends in institutional ownership on equilibrium credit spreads and the funding costs of corporations. Overall, our model emphasizes the composition of institutional demand as an important state variable for corporate bond pricing.