I solve in closed form for the optimal dynamic risk choice of a fund manager who is compensated with a high-water mark contract. The optimal risk choice depends on the ratio of the fund's assets under management to its high-water mark. If the manager's outside option value is low, investors' termination policy is strict, or management fees are high, then negative returns induce the manager into "derisking." Otherwise, he engages in "gambling." Having the option to walk away increases risk taking, though in many cases exercise is never optimal. In particular, leaving to restart at a proportionally smaller fund is always suboptimal.

I solve in closed form for the optimal dynamic risk choice of a fund manager who is compensated with a high-water mark contract. The optimal risk choice depends on the ratio of the fund's assets under management to its high-water mark. If the manager's outside option value is low, investors' termination policy is strict, or management fees are high, then negative returns induce the manager into “derisking.” Otherwise, he engages in “gambling.” Having the option to walk away increases risk taking, though in many cases exercise is never optimal. In particular, leaving to restart at a proportionally smaller fund is always suboptimal.

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.