This paper compares the trading patterns of amateur and professional investors during the days following the weekend. The comparison is based on all the daily transactions of a large sample of both amateurs and professionally managed investors in a major brokerage house in Israel from 1994 to 1998. We find that weekends influence both amateurs and professional investors; however they affect them in opposite directions. Individuals increase both their buy and sell activities, and their propensity to sell rises more than their propensity to buy. Professionals on the other hand tend to perform fewer buy as well as sell trades after the weekend, but unlike individuals, the drop in their activity is almost the same for buy trades and for sell trades. The results agree with previous hypotheses raised in the literature, which were not directly tested, about the effects of the weekend on the predisposition to trade of individuals and institutions in other markets. We also find that returns on the Israeli Stock Market Index are correlated in general with the behavioral patterns exhibited by the investors in our sample. In particular the returns on the days following the weekend are lower than those in other weekdays in a manner consistent with the behavioral patterns we found.

This paper demonstrates that preferred stock may arise as an optimal security in a tax-induced equilibrium. This result is driven by graduated tax schedules and by uncertainty. In a more general sense, our results can be interpreted as a template for including any security with a different tax treatment in a firm's capital structure. The first part of the paper demonstrates that the Miller equilibrium framework can accommodate more than two securities if different investor classes are taxed differently on each security and the tax schedule for each investor group is upward sloping. We then simplify the tax schedule, but introduce uncertainty, which implies the possibility of bankruptcy and the possible loss of tax shelters. The interaction of tax rates and seniority now affects the contribution of each security to after-tax firm value, as in some states the firm may not be able to pay either interest (or dividends) or even principal to its various claimholders. It is shown why and how these features, i.e. the various tax rates and seniority, determine the financing equilibrium, which is obtained by equating the expected marginal tax benefit of all securities. We demonstrate that non-profitable firms will tend to issue preferred shares whereas profitable firms will not find preferred stock advantageous in our framework. Comparative statics with respect to various tax rates are derived as well. These predictions are tested using a large sample of firms for the last 25 years. The empirical testing broadly confirms the theoretical predictions.