We study slow moving debt crises: self-fulfilling equilibria in which high interest rates, due to the fear of a future default, lead to a gradual but faster accumulation of debt, ultimately validating investors’ fear. We show that slow moving crises arise in a variety of settings, both when fiscal policy follows a given rule and when it is chosen by an optimizing government. A key assumption, in all these settings, is that the borrowing government cannot commit to issue a fixed amount of bonds in a given period. We discuss how multiplicity is avoided for low debt levels, for sufficiently responsive fiscal policy rules, and for long enough debt maturities. When the equilibrium is unique, debt dynamics are characterized by a tipping point, below which debt falls and stabilizes and above which debt and default rates grow.

This paper extends the benchmark New-Keynesian model by introducing two frictions: (i) agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and occasionally-binding borrowing constraints; and (ii) bounded rationality in the form of level-k thinking. Compared to the benchmark model, we show that the interaction of these two frictions leads to a powerful mitigation of the effects of monetary policy, which is more pronounced at long horizons, and offers a potential rationalization of the “forward guidance puzzle.” Each of these frictions, in isolation, would lead to no or much smaller departures from the benchmark model.

We study the interactions between sovereign debt default and maturity choice in a setting with limited commitment for repayment as well as future debt issuances. Our main finding is that, under a wide range of conditions, the sovereign should, as long as default is not preferable, remain passive in long‐term bond markets, making payments and retiring long‐term bonds as they mature but never actively issuing or buying back such bonds. The only active debt‐management margin is the short‐term bond market. We show that any attempt to manipulate the existing maturity profile of outstanding long‐term bonds generates losses, as bond prices move against the sovereign. Our results hold regardless of the shape of the yield curve. The yield curve captures the average costs of financing at different maturities but is misleading regarding the marginal costs.