[Research Summary: Here, I document the governing copyright law and process of digitizing print records with specific application to the Jaques Cattell directories of U.S. R&D. This novel dataset covers 2,805 companies with 8,525 facilities, including location, reporting line within the organization, numbers of professional staff and technicians, and R&D fields over the years 1975–1998. The dataset includes a match to the Compustat identifier, gvkey. As an illustration, I use the new dataset to investigate the effect of organization structure on innovation. By contrast with previous research based on smaller samples, I find no significant relation between organization structure and innovation. Managerial Summary: Here, I document the governing copyright law and process of digitizing print records with specific application to the Jaques Cattell directories of U.S. R&D. This novel dataset covers 2,805 companies with 8,525 facilities, including location, reporting line within the organization, numbers of professional staff and technicians, and R&D fields over the years 1975–1998. The dataset is matched to Compustat. It can be used to study novel issues including (a) the effect of complementary manufacturing and marketing assets on how a company exploits its technological capabilities; (b) the relation between the centralization of the R&D organization and productivity of innovation; (c) how clusters influence the location of R&D facilities; and (iv) how state law affects the geography of R&D.]

Research summary : This article applies data from LinkedIn to advance strategy research into the effect of human capital on mobility of engineers and scientists. Through an inventor survey, we show that LinkedIn provides more accurate career histories than patents. Compared to LinkedIn , patent measures of mobility generate 12 percent false positives and 83 percent false negatives. Using LinkedIn , we review findings from previous research using patents to track the effect of human capital on mobility. One previous finding is robust: that mobility is higher in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Other findings are possibly sensitive to the measure of mobility or sample selection. We interpret our results as the outcome of targeted retention of human capital. Data for this study may be accessed at FIVE, five.dartmouth.edu . Managerial summary : How does the mobility of engineers and scientists depend on their human capital? Previous research used patents to track inventor mobility and concluded that employers targeted inventors for recruitment by their human capital. Here, we introduce data from LinkedIn to review the previous research. Through an inventor survey, we show that LinkedIn provides more accurate career histories than patents. Compared to LinkedIn, patent measures of mobility generate 12 percent false positives and 82 percent false negatives. Among the previous findings, we show that one is robust: mobility is higher among inventors in Silicon Valley than elsewhere. Other findings are possibly sensitive to the measure of mobility or sample selection. Our results suggest that current employers target engineers and scientists for retention according to their human capital . Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

If not well targeted, advertising and direct marketing inflict nuisance and inconvenience on consumers. Theoretical analyses predict that consumer actions to avoid advertising impose externalities on other consumers. We investigate the extent of such externalities in the context of the U.S. Do Not Call (DNC) registry by exploiting the exogenous timing of the enforcement of the registry. Supported by multiple robustness tests, and validation and falsification exercises, we conclude that consumer DNC registrations imposed externalities on other consumers. An increase in the first wave of registrations by 1% was associated with a 3.1% increase in subsequent registrations. This effect was stronger in larger and more educationally or racially heterogeneous markets. The externality was possibly due to unregistered consumers being more receptive to telemarketing and telemarketers increasing calls to them. Our results suggest that managers should facilitate consumer opt-out, especially in larger and more educationally or racially heterogeneous markets. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2051 . This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.

Despite annual expenditures on public relations exceeding $19.42 billion, U.S. businesses lack practical guidance about the effectiveness of publicity in mass media. Here, we assemble a rich and novel data set to gauge the impact of news reports on consumer sign-ups with the U.S. Do Not Call (DNC) Registry. Using multiple identification strategies, we found robust evidence that news reports increased consumer registrations. Specifically, a 1% increase in the number of news reports increased DNC registrations by 0.018%. The impact increased with mention of the toll-free telephone number and URL, but decreased with the length of the headline and main text. Furthermore, we found evidence that reports affect behavior through persuasion as well as information—the impact on registration was higher for reports that mentioned the number of other people registering. Finally, the impact of news reports on consumer registration was stronger in national than local newspapers and in politically neutral and Democrat than Republican newspapers. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors. This paper was accepted by Pradeep Chintagunta and Preyas Desai, special issue editors.

We introduce the concept of marketing avoidance—consumer efforts to conceal themselves and to deflect marketing. The setting is one in which sellers market some item through solicitations to potential consumers, who differ in their benefit from the item and suffer harm from receiving solicitations. Concealment by one consumer induces sellers to shift solicitations to other consumers, whereas deflection does not. Solicitations cause two externalities: direct harm on consumers and the (indirect) cost of consumer concealment and deflection. We find that in markets where the marginal cost of solicitation is sufficiently low, efforts by low-benefit consumers to conceal themselves will increase the cost-effectiveness of solicitations and lead sellers to market more. However, concealment by high-benefit consumers leads sellers to market less. Furthermore, concealment by low-benefit consumers increases direct privacy harm, and consumer welfare is higher with deflection than concealment. Finally, it is optimal to impose a charge on solicitations.