This study investigates the conditions under which providing relative performance information to employees has a positive effect on performance when compensation is not tied to peer performance. Specifically, I investigate, via an experiment, the effect of relative performance information (present or absent) on performance under two compensation contracts (flat-wage or individual performance-based). Given the presence of relative performance information, I examine the effect of the type of relative performance information (private or public) on performance. Using theory from psychology, I predict and find that relative performance information positively affects performance under the two compensation contracts and that this positive effect is greater under an individual performance-based contract than under a flat-wage contract. I also predict and find that, although both public and private relative performance information have a positive effect on performance, the effect is greater when relative performance information is public. Data Availability: Data are available from the author on request.

This study investigates whether task interdependence in teams alters the effectiveness of managerial discretion in motivating team performance. Teams are particularly useful when employees' tasks are interdependent—that is, when the degree to which the increase in team performance resulting from a team member's effort depends on the effort and skills of the other team members. The reason is that the more interdependent tasks are, the more employees need to coordinate their actions and help one another to achieve their objectives. Prior research analyzing settings where task interdependence is absent suggests that providing managers with discretion over team bonus allocation can improve team performance relative to equal team bonus allocations because it strengthens the link between contributions to team output and rewards. Economic theory suggests that managerial discretion will also improve team performance when task interdependence is present and information is efficiently used. However, we use behavioral theory to predict that managerial discretion is less effective in the presence of task interdependence, because managers do not fully incorporate all relevant information into bonus decisions and because managerial discretion hurts coordination and helping, which is particularly problematic under task interdependence. We find that while discretion over compensation has a positive effect on team performance relative to equal bonus allocation when task interdependence is absent, it has a negative effect when task interdependence is present. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theory. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by suggesting that, ironically, managerial discretion may be most useful when the potential benefits of employing teams are lowest and least useful when the potential benefits are highest. Our results help explain why firms often grant managers only partial or no discretion over team members' compensation.

Knowledge is key to success in the modern business landscape. Firms invest billions of dollars every year in knowledge management systems, which commonly use artificial intelligence to allow within‐firm knowledge transfer to occur automatically. Despite this investment, these systems often fall short of producing expected results. Using psychology theory on goal dilution, we argue that a potential cause of the failure is that the prospect of knowledge transfer has a negative effect on knowledge creation. We further propose a mechanism to mitigate that effect. Specifically, we predict that the negative effect of knowledge transfer on knowledge creation will be mitigated when the linkages among firm‐ and unit‐level goals are communicated. We conduct an experiment and find that while, as predicted, the prospect of knowledge transfer has a negative effect on knowledge creation when the linkages among firm‐ and unit‐level goals are not communicated, it has the predicted positive effect when the linkages among firm‐ and unit‐level goals are communicated due to increased goal congruence. Additional analyses provide support for our underlying theories. Our results suggest that firms can adopt and communicate strategic performance measurement systems to improve the knowledge creation in a firm.

Employer‐sponsored opportunities for altruism outside the workplace can improve employee engagement and passion within the firm, enhance the firm's corporate visibility, and improve its recruitment. There is limited understanding of whether and how a firm's management control system on employees' daily tasks can influence employee willingness to engage in altruism outside the workplace. In this study, we investigate via an experiment how the incentive scheme (tournament vs. piece rate) on employees' daily tasks interacts with the difficulty level of these tasks (low vs. high) to affect employees' altruistic behavior outside the firm. Our results indicate that, compared to a piece‐rate scheme, a tournament scheme leads to a greater decrease in non‐winning participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm when the original, incentivized task is more difficult compared to when it is less difficult. Consistent with our theory, participants' feelings of excessive entitlement partially mediate the interaction effect of incentive scheme and task difficulty on participants' altruistic behavior outside the firm. This study informs firms about how the design of its incentive scheme on employees' daily task inside the firm and the nature of that task can influence employee willingness to act altruistically outside the firm.

This study investigates, via two experiments, the effects of target transparency, which reflects employees' knowledge about each other's targets in an organization, on managers' target setting decisions. We also investigate whether this effect depends on the need for help among employees. We predict and find that target transparency and need for help interact to influence managers' target setting decisions. Target transparency increases target levels when the need for help is low, but not when it is high. Further, target transparency leads managers to differentiate less between individual employee targets. This reduction is greater when the need for help is high than when it is low. Additional analyses support our theory by revealing that managers strategically set targets in a way that is consistent with an intention to motivate both effort at the individual level and help among employees when such are needed. Our results help explain anecdotal evidence of why companies that value help among employees often make targets transparent throughout the entire organization.

This study investigates whether the benefit firms can extract from team member communication to the team manager—who may use such information for rewarding individual team members—is affected by differences in the type of mutual monitoring information available to team members. We predict and find that team performance is higher when team members can observe only each other's effort than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels; conversely, team performance is lower when team members can observe only each other's output than when they can observe both each other's effort and output levels. The intuition behind these results is that the type of observable mutual monitoring information creates different degrees of ambiguity regarding what should be considered a fair reward allocation for team members' contributions. Such ambiguity reduces the usefulness of team member communication to the manager for allocating rewards, resulting in lower team performance. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.

This study investigates whether subjective communication from team members to a manager responsible for allocating performance-based bonuses increases team performance and whether the efficacy of such communication is reduced in heterogeneous teams. We draw on both economic and behavioral theories to predict that communication content, even though subjective, provides information that enables the manager to allocate bonuses so as to enhance the relation between individuals' contributions and rewards, thereby increasing individuals' effort and team performance. However, we also predict that the positive effect of team member subjective communication is more muted when team members' abilities are heterogeneous compared to homogeneous. We test these predictions via an experiment. Consistent with our predictions, team member subjective communication has a positive effect on team performance, and the positive effect is more muted for heterogeneous teams. Results of our study contribute to both theory and practice by enhancing our understanding of the role of subjective communication from team members to team managers in motivating effort in teams and, particularly, how its efficacy is affected by team composition. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors upon request.