In this article, the book written by Juan Gabriel Valdes - entitled "Pinochet's Economists: The Chicago School in Chile" - serves as a point of departure. Valdes's account of the way in which University of Chicago economists came to be linked with the Catholic University in Chile in the mid-1950s is summarized, as is his characterization of the manner in which Chilean "Chicago Boys" subsequently won control of the economics faculty there. The centerpiece of Valdes's story is the behavior of the "Chicago Boys" in restructuring Chile's economy in the service of General Pinochet's military dictatorship (1973-89). The article concludes that Valdes's treatment of two additional themes - the cross-cultural transmission of economic ideas and the capacity of Chicago School economists to accommodate to authoritarian regimes - calls for qualification.

Banks are modeled as Bryant/Diamond-Dybvig "insurers" against the risk of early consumption. Consumption claims must be verified by clearing and settlement. A clearinghouse does this efficiently as long as banks are sufficiently liquid. If liquidity requirements cannot be enforced against all banks then the threat of panics is necessary to induce banks to hold sufficient liquidity. If the clearinghouse can issue emergency currency, then banks can coexist with less liquid institutions. However, if banks′ return to holding reserves is low during "normal times," then there must be times when the return to liquidity is abnormally high. We associate these episodes with the panics of the National Banking Era. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 042, 311, 314.

This article considers the implications of allowing a manager discretion over task assignment. If employees earn rents from carrying out tasks, and the manager cannot "sell" the jobs to her subordinates, she has an incentive to take on more tasks than is optimal and delegate too few to a subordinate. I show that although firms can alleviate this incentive by offering output-contingent contracts, even with the optimal contract, (i) the manager carries out too many tasks, (ii) she exerts too much effort on her own tasks, and (iii) her subordinate exerts too little effort on his tasks.

We examine the financing and insurance policies of a firm with private information regarding its operating cash flows and insurance risk. When its insurable losses are small, the firm chooses either self-insurance or full insurance. It chooses self-insurance, it may display a preference for equity financing. However, if it chooses full insurance, it prefers debt financing. When the firm′s insurable losses are large, its insurance and financing decisions can signal its private information. While both debt and equity complement insurance decisions in signaling private information, debt facilitates signaling favorable information for a larger set of parameters. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, G22, G32.

Investment advisory firms and brokerage firms hire analysts to uncover profitable securities investment opportunities. Then these firms sell the information (either directly or indirectly) to others. Why? Given that the information has value, why do these firms not keep the information to themselves and trade solely for their own accounts? Because of competition, information is more valuable when fewer people trade on the information. This paper shows that selling information is a strategic response by competing informed traders. Specifically, it is a means for informed traders to commit to trade aggressively, thereby inducing other informed traders to trade less aggressively. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, D82.

This paper examines the relation between closed-end fund premia and returns. Additional evidence is provided on Thompson's (1978) finding that fund premia are negatively correlated with future returns. Funds with 20% discounts have expected twelve-month returns that are 6% greater than nondiscounted funds. This correlation is attributed to premium mean-reversion, not to anticipated future portfolio performance. Economically motivated explanations do not account for this effect.

Despite familiar arguments for diversification, many investors choose to hold significant blocks of equity in the same firm. While control benefits may explain majority blocks, most blocks are much smaller than what is generally considered necessary for control. This paper develops a theory whereby such blocks can confer to their holders partial benefits of control; in particular, small block shareholders can join together and form controlling coalitions. The implications of such a cooperative game among block shareholders for the shareholder structure within and across firms are examined. This paper predicts large investors will "create their own space" by staking out large enough blocks to deter other block investors, there will be a threshold level above which large investors are not challenged, and that the shareholder structure across firms will exhibit a particular clientele effect among block shareholders. These predictions are consistent with a preliminary review of empirical evidence.

"This article uses the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Public Use Samples of the U.S. census to document what happened to immigrant earnings in the 1980s and to determine if pre-1980 immigrant flows reached earnings parity with natives. The relative entry wage of successive immigrant cohorts declined by 9% in the 1970s and by an additional 6% in the 1980s. Although the relative wage of immigrants grows by 10% during the first 2 decades after arrival, recent immigrants will earn 15%-20% less than natives throughout much of their working lives."