We investigate the effects of technological change, deregulation, and dynamic changes in competition on the performance of US banks. Our most striking result is that during 1991–1997, cost productivity worsened while profit productivity improved substantially, particularly for banks engaging in mergers. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that banks tried to maximize profits by raising revenues as well as reducing costs. Banks appeared to provide additional or higher quality services that raised costs but also raised revenues by more than the cost increases. The results suggest that methods that exclude revenues when assessing performance may be misleading.

Bushee et al. (J. Accounting Econom. 34 (2003) 149–180) is a timely study in an area—corporate disclosure policy—that is increasingly important to regulators, corporate managers, and academics. The authors report several results that will be of interest to these groups. I describe the corporate disclosure issues that make the authors’ research questions of broader relevance than their specific topic might suggest. I then provide comments on theoretical and empirical aspects of the study. Overall, the study is likely to be useful in helping us understand some of the forces at work as corporate disclosure becomes more rapid, more comprehensive, and more open.

Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (J. Accounting Economics (2003) this issue) present compelling evidence that new economy firms rely more on stock-based compensation than do old economy firms, based on 1998 and 1999 data from a proprietary sample of companies. I complement the ILL results by analyzing data over a longer time period (1992–2001) and, more importantly, document the effect of the 2000 market crash on stock-based pay in new economy firms. Finally, I offer evidence supporting the conjecture that differences in pay practices between new and old economy firms reflect accounting considerations, perceived costs, and competitive inertia.

We develop a model of informal financial networks and present corroborating evidence by studying the role of property brokers in the U.S. commercial real estate market. Our model demonstrates that service intermediaries, who do not themselves supply loans, can facilitate their clients' access to finance through informal relationships with lenders. Empirically we find that, controlling for endogenous broker selection, hiring a broker strikingly increases the probability of obtaining bank finance. Our results demonstrate that even in the United States, with its well-developed capital markets, informal networks play an important role in controlling access to finance.

We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

I compare the return surrounding a sell-side analyst's initiation of coverage to the return surrounding a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. The market responds more positively to analysts' initiations than to other recommendations. The incremental price impact of an initiation is 1.02% greater than the reaction to a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. I examine whether the hypothesis that analyst coverage increases liquidity explains this incremental return. I find that liquidity improves after initiations, but that one must extend the liquidity hypothesis in order to fully explain the incremental price impact. Liquidity gains subsequent to analyst initiation depend on the analyst's recommendation. The more positive the initial recommendation, the greater the subsequent liquidity improvement. I also find that the initiation abnormal return correlates with the subsequent improvements in liquidity. Corporations should encourage analyst coverage to capture this liquidity benefit.

This article examines employer demand for welfare recipients using new employer survey data. The results suggest that demand is high but sensitive to business cycle conditions. Factors including skill needs and industry affect prospective employer demand for recipients, while other characteristics that affect their relative supply to employers (e.g., establishment location) influence whether such demand is realized in actual hiring. The conditional demand for black and Hispanic welfare recipients lags behind their representation in the welfare population and seems affected by employers’ location and indicators of preferences. Thus, many demand‐side factors limit the employment options of welfare recipients, especially minorities.

This article examines the link between several well-known asset pricing “anomalies” and the covariance structure of returns. I find size, book-to-market, and momentum strategies exhibit a strong, weak, and negligible relation to covariance risk, respectively. A size factor helps predict future volatility and covariation, improving the efficiency of investment strategies. Moreover, its premium rises following increases in both its volatility and covariation with other assets. These effects are amplified in recessions. No such relations exist for book-to-market or momentum. These findings may shed light on explanations for these premia and present a challenging set of facts for future theory.

This article examines the link between several well-known asset pricing "anomalies" and the covariance structure of returns. I find size, book-to-market, and momentum strategies exhibit a strong, weak, and negligible relation to covariance risk, respectively. A size factor helps predict future volatility and covariation, improving the efficiency of investment strategies. Moreover, its premium rises following increases in both its volatility and covariation with other assets. These effects are amplified in recessions. No such relations exist for book-to-market or momentum. These findings may shed light on explanations for these premia and present a challenging set of facts for future theory.