Counterparty risk could hamper trade and worsen a financial crisis. A central clearing party (CCP) insures traders against counterparty default and thus benefits trade. Default of the CCP however becomes a new systemic risk. CCP risk management does not account for risks associated with crowded positions. This paper proposes a CCP exposure measure based on tail risk in trader portfolios. It identifies and measures crowded risk and assigns it to traders according to the polluter pays principle. CCP data show that crowded positions increase CCP exposure most (about one-third) on turbulent days, when exposure is high already.

I discuss changes to bank supervision and regulation since the financial crisis. Microprudential supervision promotes the safety and soundness of individual institutions, while macroprudential supervision focuses on emerging risks to financial system stability. I highlight tools for implementing this macroprudential approach to promoting financial stability, and discuss the interactions and proper relationship between monetary policy and financial stability. While macroprudential tools should be the first line of defense against emerging financial imbalances, in cases where those tools proved to be inadequate to limit risks to financial stability, monetary policy should be considered as a possible defense.

In response to the question in the title, Does Altruism Exist?, David Sloan Wilson argues forcefully that altruism exists and that the biological mechanism of group selection is responsible. He argues that group selection should be taken especially seriously for humans, since cultural evolution is especially important for us. Economists' view of basic human motivations should then include altruism. Wilson promotes a strong form of pervasive altruism, which seems bound to be inconsistent with many economic phenomena. Although a moderate version of the position he advocates is not easily dismissed, it is unclear what such an extended theory would look like.

Does support to distressed banks early on during financial crises mitigate the macroeconomic consequences of financial distress, and if so does it matter what form the intervention takes? We analyze the effects of government and central bank interventions in 69 systemic banking crises since 1980, of which 29 are part of the recent global financial crisis. Our estimation approach controls for the correlation between intervention measures and the time-invariant component of unobservable crisis severity. We find that timely bank recapitalizations substantially reduce the duration of recessions, underscoring the distortions caused by zombie banks and the costs of regulatory forbearance.

Algorithmically recommending workers to employers for the purpose of recruiting can substantially increase hiring: in an experiment conducted in an online labor market, employers with technical job vacancies that received recruiting recommendations had a 20% higher fill rate compared to the control. There is no evidence that the treatment crowded out hiring of nonrecommended candidates. The experimentally induced recruits were highly positively selected and were statistically indistinguishable from the kinds of workers employers recruit “on their own.” Recommendations were most effective for job openings that were likely to receive a smaller applicant pool.

Stephen S. Cohen and J. Bradford DeLong view US economic policy extending up to 1980 as pragmatically fostering growth. This they interpret as the Hamiltonian tradition, and their intent is to rescue policy debate from the data- and logic-free quagmire into which they believe it has fallen. Following an introduction, section 2 of this essay describes methods and evidence that permit statements about the historical influence of ideological thinking more empirically grounded than those essayed by the authors. Section 3 examines specific aspects of their narrative. Section 4 considers what we mean by ideological thinking, and why it might be deleterious.

We analyze the effects of spot market short-sale constraints on derivatives trading using a unique Chinese stock market futures trading database. Due to short-sale constraints, investors’ pessimistic views on the underlying index can be expressed solely through short futures positions, while investors’ optimistic views are dispersed through their spot and futures trading. We hypothesize that trading of pessimistic investors (with net short futures positions) contains more information than that of optimistic investors. We document the negative volatility–volume relation is associated with pessimistic investors’ trading, which attenuates with less-restricted spot market short-sale rules. Large pessimistic investors’ net demand can predict future returns, but not the case for optimistic investors.

We provide evidence on the distributional effects of Quebec’s universal child care policy. Our analysis uncovers substantial policy relevant heterogeneity in the estimated effect of access to subsidized child care across two developmental score distributions for children from two-parent families. Whereas past research reported findings of negative effects on mothers and children from these families, igniting controversy, our estimates reveal a more nuanced image that formal child care can indeed boost developmental outcomes for children from some households: particularly disadvantaged single-parent households. We present suggestive evidence that the heterogeneity in policy effects is consistent with differences in home learning environments.

This paper provides cross-country evidence on the association between soundness and competition in the life insurance industry, where competition is measured by the Boone indicator. We analyse 10 European Union (EU) life insurance markets over the post-deregulation period 1999–2011. The results indicate that competition increases the soundness of the EU life insurance markets. Since the Boone indicator measures competition based on the reallocation of profits from inefficient insurers to efficient ones, our results suggest that efficiency is the mechanism through which competition contributes to insurer solvency. The soundness-enhancing effect of competition is greater for weak insurers than for healthy ones.