ABSTRACT We examine a distribution that is taxed as a capital gain rather than as a dividend. Since the distribution induces a realized capital gain while the price change is an unrealized gain, ex‐day return behavior provides evidence of the value of tax‐timing capital gains. We show that investors are compensated 7¢ in unrealized gains for each dollar of realized capital gains, that is, $1 of realized capital gains is equivalent to 93¢ of unrealized gains. An investor with a tax rate on realized gains of 15% has an effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains of 8.6%.

The importance of cash-flow uncertainty in payout policy has received little attention in empirical studies, while survey studies such as [Lintner, J., 1956. Distribution of incomes of operations among dividends, retained earnings, and taxes. American Economic Review 46, 97–113.] and [Brav, A., Graham, J., Harvey C., Michaely, R., 2005. Payout policy in the 21st century. Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483–527.] indicate its importance. With worldwide firm-level data, we present evidence that cash-flow uncertainty is an important cross-sectional determinant of corporate payout policy. Our results show that across countries, cash-flow uncertainty, as proxied by stock return volatility, has a negative impact on the amount of dividends as well as the probability of paying dividends. The impact of cash-flow uncertainty on dividends is generally stronger than the impact of other potential determinants of payout policy—such as the earned/contributed capital mix, agency conflicts, and investment opportunities. We also find that the effect of cash-flow uncertainty on dividends is distinct from the effect of a firm's financial life-cycle stage.

We examine the effect of a large dividend tax cut on corporate investment efficiency by exploiting the 2003 personal taxation reform in the U.S. as a quasi-natural experiment. Using a difference-in-differences approach based on the probability that a firm’s marginal investor was an individual investor, we show that the 2003 dividend tax cut significantly improved the investment efficiency of U.S. listed firms. However, we find no evidence that the dividend tax cut increased the level of investment of U.S. listed firms. Further, we show that the tax cut increased investment efficiency by mitigating agency problems associated with the excessive free cash flows of overinvesting firms and by relaxing the financial constraints of underinvesting firms.

This study uses the quantile regression method to determine the relative importance of internal and external sources of funds in financing corporate investments across different levels of investment activities. Our findings lend support to the first (internal–external) rung of the pecking order, as investments are more responsive to internal funds than to external funds at almost all investment levels except at top investment levels. However, empirical support for the second (debt–equity) rung of the pecking order is tenuous, as investments are more responsive to equity issuance than to debt issuance at low and medium investment levels. Intriguingly, firms rely primarily on internal funds for organic growth (via capital expenditures or R&D spending), whereas they use debt capital heavily in financing acquisition-led growth. Finally, firms at high investment levels hold large cash holdings and save a significantly large fraction of equity issue proceeds as cash.