This article develops a model in which quit rates, and thus the income distribution, depend on employee perceptions of the accuracy of employer assessments of individual productivity because these latter assessments affect wages. When employees believe that these assessments are accurate, income inequality tends to be high. The model can account for the negative correlation across some countries of inequality and the extent to which inequality is deemed to be excessive. It also fits the contrast in U.S. and French experiences concerning the tenure of highly educated workers with high wages relative to the tenure of lower‐paid workers.

This paper studies the consequences for the behaviour of aggregate output of the perception on the part of firms that changing prices is costly. The rational expectations equilibrium of an economy with many such firms is constructed. It is shown that in this economy nominal shocks have a persistent effect on aggregate output. Furthermore, the real wage is demonstrated to move procyclically in such an economy.

This paper studies a model of random technical progress where technology diffuses at realistically slow rates. It fits smooth trends to the sum of GDP series generated by this model and series representing transitory, or cyclical, fluctuations. Detrended GDP is then largely unrelated to technical progress. The detrending method proposed by Rotemberg (1999) reconstructs cyclical variations somewhat more accurately than the HP filter. With sufficiently slow diffusion it is also more accurate than a method based on VARs fitted to hours and GDP growth. Consistent with the model’s predictions, permanent shocks initially depress both hours and output in these VARs.

I consider a model in which the threat of customer departures induces sellers to supply high-quality goods. Permanent attachment of buyer and seller such that transactions take place inside a firm raises the social cost of delivering high quality. Yet, such costly integration is often profitable, because prices exceed marginal cost at equilibria where market transactions provide high quality. This theory can rationalize the empirical finding that middle managers are averse to transactions between profit centers.

In public discussions of policy, evidence that import‐competing sectors earn low or falling incomes is often used to argue for protection. This paper rationalizes the apparent effectiveness of this argument in both direct and indirect democracies. In direct democracies, a small degree of voter altruism leads to protection in the specific factors model when the import‐competing sector earns little. Similarly, voter altruism creates an incentive in representative democracies for self‐interested parties to present evidence to legislators on the income of import‐competing factors. This leads to a theory in which campaign contributions buy access to legislators rather than buy votes.

This paper seeks to understand what motivates workers to be altruistic toward one another and studies whether firms benefit from encouraging these "human relations" in the workplace. The paper first proposes that feelings of altruism can be individually rational in certain settings in which the variables controlled by the workers are strategically linked. The paper then studies what this implies for equilibrium altruism in two situations. The first has workers who are paid as a function of joint output. The second is the relationship between subordinates and their supervisors.

This paper seeks to understand what motivates workers to be altruistic toward one another and studies whether firms benefit from encouraging these "human relations" in the workplace. The paper first proposes that feelings of altruism can be individually rational in certain settings in which the variables controlled by the workers are strategically linked. The paper then studies what this implies for equilibrium altruism in two situations. The first has workers who are paid as a function of joint output. The second is the relationship between subordinates and their supervisors.