We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.

Buying recent winners and shorting recent losers guarantees time-varying factor exposures in accordance with the performance of common risk factors during the ranking period. Adjusted for this dynamic risk exposure, momentum profits are remarkably stable across subperiods of the entire post-1926 era. Factor models can explain 95% of winner or loser return variability, but cannot explain their mean returns. Momentum strategies which base winner or loser status on stock-specific return components are more profitable than those based on total returns. Neither industry effects nor cross-sectional differences in expected returns are the primary cause of the momentum phenomenon.

Do stocks bear a crash risk premium? We examine the empirical performance of the tail index measure from Kelly and Jiang (2014). We find that the tail index explains the cross-section of the discount rate component of returns, but not the cash-flow component. Moreover, in the time series the tail index is uncorrelated with theoretically motivated measures of aggregate uncertainty and systemic risk. In contrast, the tail index Granger causes and is Granger caused by the level of the term structure, and the slope of the term structure Granger causes tail risk. Received June 22, 2016; editorial decision December 23, 2017 by Editor Raman Uppal.

The behavior of a risk neutral corporation in selection of a line of credit is modeled in a new framework where demand for credit lines by a firm arises from the stochastic arrival in continuous time of short-lived opportunities to capture investment projects. The firm needs speed and secrecy to capture projects before competitors. The firm chooses a credit line that balances its up-front commitment cost against the expected extra cost of borrowing in the spot market upon exhaustion of its credit line. The firm's demanded credit line depends upon both relative pricing within the contract and the nature of the firm's growth opportunities. Interestingly, while credit line demand is positively related to business growth prospects, it is potentially negatively related to uncertainty in those prospects.

Recently a new type of institution has emerged, crowd funders. These entities: 1) channel capital to create intellectual property; 2) gather information on project and entrepreneur quality; and 3) gauge demand information directly from individuals to improve the efficiency of capital allocation. Data from crowd funder Kickstarter allows new insights on capital formation and the role of entrepreneurial reputation formation in the venture funding process. This funding method includes all cases where entrepreneurs try yet fail to raise funds, a feature heretofore unavailable to researchers. We find that both positive and negative reputation acquisition significantly change measures of capital raising success.

We use a unique data set of hedge fund long equity and equity option positions to investigate a significant lockup-related premium earned during the tech bubble (1999–2001) and financial crisis (2007–2009). Net fund flows are significantly greater among lockup funds during crisis and noncrisis periods. Managers of hedge funds with locked-up capital trade opportunistically against flow-motivated trades of non-lockup managers, consistent with a hypothesis of rent extraction in providing crisis era liquidity. The success of this opportunistic trading is concentrated during periods of high borrowing costs, in less liquid stock markets, and is enhanced by hedging in the equity option market.

In the G7 countries, the short-horizon performance of aggregate return predictors such as the dividend yield and the short rate appears non-existent during business cycle expansions but sizable during contractions. This phenomenon appears related to countercyclical risk premiums as well as the time-variation in the dynamics of predictors. Our empirical model outperforms the historical average out-of-sample in the US, but the results throughout the G7 are mixed.

Mandated post-trade transparency in secondary markets lowers the cost of issuing corporate bonds. We show that costs are lower due to the mitigation of information asymmetry in the issuing process. Three pieces of evidence support this finding. First, new issues with higher information asymmetry experience relatively larger reductions in issuing costs. These bonds also experience lower reductions in trading activity than lower information asymmetry bonds, so liquidity cannot explain these results. Second, when a larger fraction of trades in comparable bonds are made post-trade transparent, new issue pricing improves. This holds when conditioning on expected bond liquidity. Third, transparency raises prices in the secondary market, but not by as much as it does for newly issued bonds.