Currency carry trades exploiting violations of uncovered interest rate parity in G10 currencies deliver significant excess returns with annualized Sharpe ratios equal to or greater than those of equity market factors (1990–2012). Using data on out-of-the-money foreign exchange options, I compute returns to crash-hedged portfolios and demonstrate that the high returns to carry trades are not due to peso problems. A comparison of the returns to hedged and unhedged trades indicates crash risk premia account for at most one-third of the excess return to currency carry trades.

We develop an analytical solution to the dynamic portfolio choice problem of an investor with power utility defined over wealth at a finite horizon, who faces a time-varying investment opportunity set, parameterized using a flexible vector autoregression. We apply this framework to study the horizon effects in the allocations of equity-only investors, who hold a mix of value and growth indices, and a more general investor, who also has access to Treasury bills and bonds. We find that the mean allocation of equity-only investors is heavily tilted towards value stocks at short-horizons, but the magnitude of this tilt declines dramatically with the investment horizon, implying that growth is less risky than value at long horizons. Investors with access to bills and bonds exhibit similar behavior, when value and growth tilts are computed relative to the total equity allocation of the portfolio. However, after accounting for the propensity of these investors to increase their total equity allocation as the horizon increases, the mean value tilt of the optimal allocation is shown to be positive and stable across time.

Traditional risk factor models indicate that hedge funds capture pre‐fee alphas of 6% to 10% per annum over the period from 1996 to 2012. At the same time, the hedge fund return series is not reliably distinguishable from the returns of mechanical S&P 500 put‐writing strategies. We show that the high excess returns to hedge funds and put‐writing are consistent with an equilibrium in which a small subset of investors specialize in bearing downside market risks. Required rates of return in such an equilibrium can dramatically exceed those suggested by traditional models, affecting inference about the attractiveness of these investments.

The central insight of asset pricing is that a security's value depends both on its distribution of payoffs across economic states and on state prices. In fixed income markets, many investors focus exclusively on estimates of expected payoffs, such as credit ratings, without considering the state of the economy in which default occurs. Such investors are likely to be attracted to securities whose payoffs resemble economic catastrophe bonds—bonds that default only under severe economic conditions. We show that many structured finance instruments can be characterized as economic catastrophe bonds, but offer far less compensation than alternatives with comparable payoff profiles.

This paper models transaction costs as the rents that a monopolistic market maker extracts from impatient investors who trade via limit orders. We show that limit orders are American options. The limit prices inducing immediate execution of the order are functionally equivalent to bid and ask prices and can be solved for various transaction sizes to characterize the market maker's entire supply curve. We find considerable empirical support for the model's predictions in the cross‐section of NYSE firms. The model produces unbiased, out‐of‐sample forecasts of abnormal returns for firms added to the S&P 500 index.