This study documents substantial gains accuring to shareholders of discounted closed-end investment companies when these funds are reorganized to allow shareholders to obtain the market value of the fund's assets. The findings indicate that the discounts on closedend funds are real, i.e., they are not the sole result of inaccurate reporting of the fund's net asset value. The study also documents significant abnormal returns after the announcement of management-sponsored proposals to reorganize. This finding is inconsistent with the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and that the market model (as estimated) is the correct return bench mark for funds undertaking reorganization.

This study examines the stock price reaction around the announcement of proposed changes in long-term managerial compensation packages. The evidence indicates that on average these plans are met with positive market reactions, i.e., shareholder wealth increases. Further, we are unable to differentiate the market reaction to various types of long-range compensation schemes. This result is consistent with the notion that firms with different characteristics will resolve their managerial compensation requirements differently. Thus no particular compensation package necessarily dominates all others.

Financial economists are interested in whether alternative compensation plans are adopted primarily for tax, incentive or signaling reasons. As most compensation plans have tax implications, examining for other effects is difficult. In this paper we examine the stock market reaction to employee stock purchase plans which are ‘non-tax advantageous’ and adopted for incentive/signaling reasons. The results suggest that (1) equity-based compensation schemes have a positive effect on shareholder wealth for reasons other than tax reduction, (2) a motive for adopting these plans is to align managerial and shareholder interests, and (3) equity ownership motivates key executives more than subordinate employees.