This paper examines multiple-bidder corporate control contests involving white knights, who are late-entry collaborative bidders. We employ auction theory to structure the analysis and examine the valuation consequences for bidding firms. An immediate white knight response to a hostile bid is met with a strong, negative market reaction. When the white knight and hostile bidder get into a ‘bidding war’ with follow-up bids by each, the white knight (but not the hostile bidder) loses each time it bids. However, if the white knight bid follows two consecutive, hostile bids and the contest ends, there are minimal losses to the white knight, which are statistically indistinguishable from the mildly positive reaction to the preceding hostile bids.

We examine security price reactions around the announcements of 123 voluntary spin-offs by 116 firms between 1963 and 1981 involving a pro-rata distribution of the common stock of a subsidiary to the stockholders of the parent firm. The median spin-off in the sample is 6.6% of the original equity value and is associated with an abnormal return of 7.0% from 50 days prior to the announcement through completion of the spin-off. No evidence is found to indicate the gains to stockholders represent wealth transfers from senior securityholders. Over the entire event period we find positive gains for firms engaging in spin-offs to facilitate mergers or to separate diverse operating units but negative returns to firms responding to legal and/or regulatory difficulties. In the two-day interval surrounding the first press announcement we find positive average excess returns for all groups.

We investigate the valuation consequences of voluntary proposals to sell part or all of a corporation's assets. For partial sell-offs, successful sellers and buyers reap statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.66% and 0.83%, respectively. Unsuccessful sellers realize gains at the bid announcement of 1.41% that are lost at the offer termination. In contrast, proposals to liquidate the firm are associated with significant average abnormal returns of 12.24%. We interpret these findings as evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses rather than as evidence of market mispricing before the divestiture announcements.

We analyze the costs and benefits of clawback provisions that enable firms to recover incentive compensation from top management if financials are restated. In a simple contracting model, we find that a clawback provision effectively lengthens the horizon of incentives and curbs misreporting. However, such a provision can add noise to the underlying performance measure, reducing managerial effort and firm value. Our empirical tests support the model’s predictions regarding which types of firms are likely to voluntarily use clawback provisions. We also document that clawback provisions are associated with higher reporting quality, greater CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, and higher CEO compensation.

Whether, and how, the introduction of deposit insurance affects non-bank financial market development depends on whether banks and non-bank financial markets are substitutes or complements and theory has conflicting views. Using data on 134 countries over a 28-year period and several identification strategies we find that the introduction of deposit insurance retards the equity market, the non-bank depositaries sector, and the banking sector when law and order is weak. While strong law and order mitigates this effect, it does not lead to a positive outcome for all markets. For non-bank financial markets, the effect is greater in the long run so that while deposit insurance increases banking sector development in the long run, it retards non-bank financial markets regardless of the level of law and order. Finally, several design features exacerbate the negative outcomes. Our results have important policy implications for implementing or altering deposit insurance schemes.